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ABSTRACT 
The Incident Command System (ICS) resulted from the need for a new approach to the 
problem of managing wildfires in the early 1970s. The events of September 11, 2001, led 
to issuing of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 requiring agencies to 
adopt ICS as their incident management system. However, in events of national 
significance since then, internal communications have not performed well, causing 
numerous response problems. In addition, public information systems have failed to meet 
the community’s expectations and keep the public informed about the size, scope, and 
impact of the emergency.  
Three models of possible solutions for addressing the problem were assessed. 
Model 1 consists of expanding the Communications Unit within the Logistics Section. 
Model 2 expands and clearly defines the duties, roles and responsibilities of the Public 
Information Officer. Model 3 merges all communications functions into one section 
directly under the Incident Commander. Metrics were designed around the management 
characteristics of the ICS and were assessed utilizing a defined scale. 
The research found that the creation of the Communication Section would provide 
the most benefits towards improving communications. However, that model may be 
difficult to implement due to resistance to strategic change.  
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In Homeland security presidential directive (HSPD) 5- Management of 
Domestic incidents, the President directed me to develop, submit for 
review to the Homeland Security Council, and administer a National 
Incident Management System. This system will provide a consistent 
nationwide approach for Federal, State, Local and tribal governments to 
work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, prevent, respond 
to, and recover from domestic incidents regardless of the cause, size, or 
complexity 
Tom Ridge, 20041 
A. BACKGROUND—THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM 
The Incident Command System (ICS) resulted from the obvious need for a new 
approach to the problem of managing rapidly moving wildfires in the early 1970s. At the 
time, emergency managers faced a number of problems in managing large, complex or 
expanding incidents. These included too many people reporting to one supervisor, 
different emergency response organizational structures, lack of reliable incident 
information, inadequate and incompatible communications, and unclear lines of 
authority. 
Emergency management and incident management refer to the broad spectrum of 
activities and organizations providing effective and efficient operations, coordination, 
and support.2 Emergency management describes the science of managing complex 
systems and multidisciplinary personnel to address events and incidents, across all 
hazards, and through the phases of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. 
Incident management, by contrast, includes acquiring, coordinating, and delivering 
resources to incident sites; directing specific incident operations; and sharing information 
about the incident with the public. Response activities directly address the hazard impact, 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security. “National Incident Management System,” 2004, 5. 




including actions taken in anticipation of an impending event (e.g., hurricane, tornado) 
and actions during and after an impact has occurred. 
In 13 days of fire in 1970, 16 lives were lost, 700 structures were destroyed and 
500,000 acres were burned. Much of this occurred within the jurisdictions of the Los 
Angeles City and Los Angeles County fire departments. Post-incident critiques indicated 
that while both departments cooperated with each other, their joint effectiveness did not 
meet the expectations of either agency. Shortly thereafter, responding to catastrophic fires 
throughout California, with similar post-incident critiques, Congress tasked the U.S 
Forest Service with the goal of improving incident management and resource 
coordination aimed specifically at wildland fires. Designing a standard incident 
management system to remedy the problems took several years and field-testing. 
Development of the system took an inter-agency task force with cooperating local, state, 
and federal efforts. The early developmental process recognized and keyed on several 
requirements for the system that exists today. These requirements were that the system 
must be organizationally flexible to meet the needs of incidents of any kind and size; 
agencies must be able to use the system on a day-to-day basis for routine situations as 
well as for major emergencies; it must be sufficiently standard to allow personnel from a 
variety of agencies and diverse geographical locations to rapidly meld into a common 
management structure, and it must be cost-effective. 
The result was the ICS. Initial ICS applications were designed for responding to 
wildland fires. However, the characteristics of these wildland fire incidents was found to 
be similar to those seen in many law enforcement, hazardous materials and other kinds of 
situations, and ICS became an all-hazards system.  
Public safety agencies saw the benefits of the ICS and of a single incident 
management system and the adoption of ICS spread. The adoption was facilitated on 
occasions due to catastrophic events. The events of September 11, 2001, and the resulting 




(HSPD) 5 on February 28, 2003.3  The effective result of HSPD 5 was that all agencies 
adopted the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and ICS as their incident 
management system.  
When coping with a natural disaster, wildfire, disease outbreak or any other 
incident, agencies at the local, state, and federal levels have to effectively communicate, 
coordinate operations, and allocate resources. ICS is the approach to be used by those 
agencies to assemble and control the temporary systems they employ to manage 
personnel and equipment at emergencies. The ICS is a tiered system. The organizational 
layers are used only when appropriate and only as dictated by system complexity. The 
highest management level is the incident commander, command staff, which includes the 
management staff and the general staff of four functional section chiefs. The ICS is built 
around the five functions of management, command, planning, operations, logistics, and 
finance. (Intelligence/Investigations is an optional sixth functional area that may be 
activated on a case-by-case basis.)  The ICS, Multiagency Coordination System (MACS), 
and public information are the fundamental elements of incident management.4 
ICS has important strengths in organizing emergency response. It factors critical 
emergency tasks, establishing a clear division of labor and assignment of functional 
responsibility. It defines the chain-of-command, provides a manageable span of control 
for each function, and establishes a resource allocation, decision-making structure that is 
critically important to avoid dispute about "who is in charge" and to enable rapid 
deployment and direction of personnel and equipment. It is designed to promote 
information flows up, down, and across the organization and to the public. As a result, 
ICS is highly flexible in response to any incident type, scale, and location. 
From the very beginning, the major fire departments in California that were 
committed to the concept realized that ICS must be used on a daily basis to be 
successful.5 For firefighters, ICS was a necessary invention that addressed core 
                                                 
3 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, February 28, 2003. 
4 Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System.” 2008. 6. 




professional problems. It made good sense to train and exercise all personnel in the 
system and use it regularly, even to respond to small events. ICS became virtually second 
nature when events made it essential. For law enforcement in the U.S., by contrast, 
adoption was less enthusiastic. Comparing policing to firefighting, one notes that active 
field co-ordination involving significant numbers of police officers occurs much less 
regularly. Although it does occur, for example, in security for large events, hostage 
takings, and drug busts. Collaboration with mutual aid providers from other jurisdictions 
is quite rare. Hence, the need for ICS would seem less compelling; and the costs of 
preparing personnel and the organization as a whole may seem more burdensome, 
perhaps unjustified.6 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The ICS is not meeting the current needs of the citizens. The ICS was developed 
in the 1970s; since then, it has undergone few changes or modifications. ICS is a complex 
system with numerous components including structure, training and implementation. ICS 
has many aspects, but the communication aspect needs current attention. The focus of 
this paper is the communications problems. Communications problems in the ICS have 
not given the incident commander full situational awareness of the emergency. This issue 
prevents effective plans, inhibits response, and endangers responders and the public.  
In events of national significance since its adoption in 2004, inter-incident or 
internal communications have not performed well, causing numerous response problems. 
As more accounts of decision making during Katrina become part of the public record, it 
becomes apparent that major shortcomings of situational awareness resulted because 
information about conditions was unavailable and/or did not reach senior decision 
makers.7  
                                                 
6 Arnold Howitt and Herman B. Leonard, “A Command System for All Agencies?” Crisis/Response 
Journal. March 2005, 40–42. 





In addition, external communications or public information systems have failed to 
meet the community’s expectations and keep the public informed about the size, scope, 
and impact of the emergency. As stated in Congressional hearings regarding the 
Deepwater Horizon spill, the flow of information was poor. Craig Paul Taffaro Jr., 
president of St. Bernard Parish, stated, “The information presented by BP in print and 
broadcast media often erupted into episodes of frustration and disbelief as the disconnect 
between the reality of a local experience and the stated information was clearly 
displayed.”8  From the breaking notice that an explosion had occurred, the information 
was wrought with inconsistencies, fragmented messaging, and stove-piped 
communication patterns. The challenge to share information was never conquered.9    
Also, since the creation of the ICS, society and society’s expectations of 
emergency management have changed. These societal changes include technology 
enhancements and innovations. The uses of Internet information technologies have 
created new expectations among our citizens. They are demanding to be informed, and 
warned of impending danger. In some cases, warnings can be more important that 
response and can protect more lives. These failures of the ICS create increased impact 
from hurricanes, fires, floods, and other emergency incidents by reducing the efficiency 
of the management system. In addition, the public is increasingly uninformed as to the 
incident, their expected actions, and threats to public safety. The ultimate effect is that the 
public is adversely impacted due to the incident management’s deficiencies. The ability 
to enhance the effectiveness of incident management may serve to minimize the impact 
of such events. 
The problem centers on the ICS and or its implementation. Questions arise if the 
problem is centered on a structural deficiency of the ICS, or whether it is an 
implementation and training issue. It is important to realize that, from a design 
perspective, the form of the ICS system is a normative concept; it specifies how 
                                                 
8 Committee on Homeland Security: Hearings on Preliminary the Lessons from Deepwater Horizon. 
111th Cong. (2010). September 22, 2010. Serial No. 111–80. Statement of Mr. Craig Paul Taffaro, Jr., St. 





command and control should be performed according to the design. There is, of course, 
no guarantee that command and control will be performed in that way. It is therefore 
important to distinguish between the form of the ICS, which specifies how command and 
control should be performed, and the process of incident management and the “culture,” 
which denotes how it actually is performed. 
This paper does not explore the market penetration of the ICS or the 
appropriateness of the implementation and training regime. This paper focuses on the 
structural issues with the ICS, which facilitate or detract from effective communication. 
Specifically, this paper has narrowed the scope of the problem to focus on structural 
deficiencies in the ICS that cause incident communications, including internal 
communications and external communications (public information) problems. The 
problem is that internal communication policies, procedures, and systems have failed to 
keep leaders informed of the size and scope of the emergencies. This has led to poor 
decision making by incident commanders and other response problems. In addition, 
public information (external communications) has failed to keep the citizens informed 
about the size, scope and impact of the emergency. This creates additional risks to 
stakeholders and the public, due to missed evacuation warnings or other critical 
information.  
This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter II explores the history 
of the ICS. It identifies the beginnings in the California fire service to the present. 
Chapter II also identifies many of the milestones in the development of the ICS, the 
incidents that provoked its adoption and how the ICS has evolved. It shows that the ICS 
was constantly reviewed to ensure that the system met the needs of stakeholders. Through 
this, we must assume that this evolution is not final and that ICS will continue to be 
assessed to ensure that it is meeting current expectations. 
Chapter III presents a literature review of the ICS. The literature review focuses 





Chapter IV further defines the problem and discusses the research questions. The 
research questions to be studied are: 
1. Which type of structure would make communications in the ICS more 
efficient? 
2. Are internal (incident communications) and external communications 
(public information) related sufficiently so that they can be combined 
within the ICS? 
3. Or, do internal and external communications need to remain separated to 
operate efficiently? 
4. Would the changing the ICS communications structure meet the 
community’s current expectations? 
In addition, Chapter IV explores the research methodology. In order to fully 
assess and answer the research questions, a Soft systems methodology is utilized. Soft 
systems methodology (SSM) is a systemic approach for tackling real-world problematic 
situations.  Soft systems methodology (SSM) was developed by Peter Checkland and his 
colleagues at Lancaster University in the 1970s. It is designed to shape interventions in 
the problematic situations encountered in management, organizational, and policy 
contexts. Though informed by systems engineering approaches, it breaks with them by 
recognizing the central importance of perspective or world-view in social situations. It 
differs significantly from the “systems science” approaches developed in the 1960s, and 
is more reflective of action research in its philosophy and approach.10  
The key components of the SSM are: 
1. Identifying a real-world situation seen as calling for action to improve it; 
2. Developing models of purposeful activity relevant to this situation; 
3. Identifying a process of using the models as devices to explore the 
problem; 
                                                 




4. Conducting a structured debate about the desirable and feasible change.11  
The three models of purposeful activity are possible solutions for addressing the 
ICS communications problem. Each would involve restructuring the incident command 
system to make communications a priority. Restructuring may take alternative forms and 
each contains drawbacks.  
1. Expanding the Communications Unit Within Logistics  
This model would expand the Communications Unit within the Logistics, Service 
Branch to include all current and future internal communications functions. The Public 
Information Officer remains on the incident commander’s command staff and the 
function of public information remains as is. The expanded Communication Unit’s job 
functions would be defined to include all of the incident’s current and future 
expectations.  
The Communications Unit will be required to define new positions to encompass 
the new responsibilities and emerging technologies networking capabilities  
2. Expanding the Public Information Officer Role 
In Model 2, external communication will continue to be handled by the Public 
Information Officer (PIO). The PIO would continue to support the incident command 
structure as a member of the command staff and advise the incident commander/unified 
commander on all public information matters relating to the management of the incident. 
The position would be given specific responsibilities and tasks that the defined PIO 
would be required to complete. This option would keep the internal communication 
support functions within the Communications Unit within Logistics 
The PIO may be assigned assistant PIOs as allowed under ICS. However, these 
assistants will have duties and responsibilities defined to meet the expanding 
communication requirements. These requirements will ensure that incident information 
                                                 
11 Peter Checkland and John Poulter, “Learning For Action: A Short Definitive Account of Soft 
Systems Methodology, and Its Use Practitioners, Teachers and Students,”(New Jersey: John Wiley and 




reaches the existing people and networks. Social media will be utilized to reach out to the 
community to deliver warnings and information. In addition, new media will be utilized 
to bring relevant information from the community to the incident.  
3. Creating a Communications Section 
The ICS now has four sections: Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance. 
Deep within the Logistics section, under the Support Branch, resides the 
Communications Unit. External Communication is handled by a member of the command 
staff, the PIO. While the PIO may have assistants assigned on an as-needed basis, a clear, 
defined organization is not defined. This model is to merge all communications functions 
into one section directly under the Incident Commander. Within the Communications 
Section, all information collection, creation and delivery systems will be combined into 
one section reporting directly to the Incident Commander. 
This section would handle all internal and external communications functions, 
with each having a separate unit, group, or—if necessary— separate branches. 
In identifying a process of using the models as devices to explore the problem, we 
have returned to the tenants of the ICS. The ICS was designed to adhere to 14 key 
management concepts. In addition, research has identified five adaptability criteria and 
four criteria measuring the expectation for success. The criteria are explained in greater 
detail in Chapter IV. An objective measure of effectiveness of each model would prove 
difficult since the options would have little opportunities for field testing, thus effectively 
preventing the collection of a great deal of quantitative data on the benefits of any of the 
options. Therefore, the criteria for judging the success of each of the options must include 
an estimate of effectiveness of promoting the primary goal of the ICS, that being to serve 
the needs of the community, to protect lives, and save property. In addition, measures of 







The models seek changes in the current incident command system and are 
measured as to how they affect command, control, communication, coordination, and 
cooperation within the system. A matrix of the tenants of the ICS is utilized and the 
options are evaluated in each category. 
Chapter V describes the models in depth. Each model presents its expected 
outcomes and its intent to improve incident management communications. Chapter VI 
begins the structured debate about the desirable and feasible change. Utilizing the matrix 
developed of the key concepts measured against the models, the research identifies the 
optimum models to recommend. The recommendations will also have considered the 
most likely recommendations of success. 
Metrics are assessed utilizing a scale of 1 to 9, with 9 offering the most 
improvement over the current system. A rating of 5 will define a neutral benefit (no 
change) and 1 will signify a reduction from the current practice. 
Chapter VII presents a summary of the findings and final recommendations. In 
addition, it discusses areas of further study. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The proposed outcome of the research intends to identify an alternative ICS 
structure that will improve internal and external communications. The benefits of the 
research could lead to a stronger national response plan and an improved National 
Incident Management System. 
The following chapter begins with the history of the ICS and how it spread from 




II. HISTORY OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM 
There was a desert wind blowing that night. It was one of those hot dry 
Santa Anas that come down through the mountain passes and curl your 
hair and make your nerves jump and your skin itch. On nights like that 
every booze party ends in a fight. Meek little wives feel the edge of the 
carving knife and study their husbands' necks. Anything can happen.12   
Raymond Chandler, Red Wind,  
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the history of the Incident Command System, including. 
the birth and development, and the reasons it was necessitated. In addition, this chapter 
discusses some of the major incidents that led to adoption. It tracks the ICS spread from 
Southern California to the entire State of California and through federal agencies that 
were the early adopters. This chapter also discusses the development of the ICS in 
Australia. The development of the Australian ICS is a key parallel to the United States 
system and the lessons learned from Australia can be applied here. This chapter 
concludes with incidents of national significance since nationwide adoption and highlight 
ICS communication issues. 
The sun rose over Southern California on September 22, 1970, and the Los 
Angeles Times was predicting another hot, dry day.13 The 1970 fire season was well 
under way. During the previous weeks, numerous fires had already burned; under these 
conditions, the fire danger was high.14  This day was to be like many others, warming to 
90 degrees, dry, with a potential Santa Ana Wind.  
Southern California contains a unique geography. Along the edge of California, 
millions live in communities such as Santa Barbara, moving southward towards Ventura, 
                                                 
12 Raymond Chandler, “Red Wind.” Available at http://ae-lib.org.ua/texts-
c/chandler__red_wind__en.htm. 1. 
13 “Weather.” Los Angeles Times, September 22, 1970, sec. Part II. 





Malibu, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Long Beach, stretching to San Diego and the 
Mexican border. To the west lies the Pacific Ocean and to the east lies the Mohave 
Desert. Normal weather patterns have the sun shining on the Mohave Desert floor, 
heating the air. This hot air rises, creating an area of lower relative pressure. Normal wind 
currents will flow from a higher pressure area to a lower pressure. This pressure 
differential draws in air from the west, thus bringing in air cooled by the Pacific. This 
cooler air helps maintain a temperate climate for most of Southern California almost year 
around.15 
However, occasionally during the fall and early winter, a low pressure system 
parks itself off the coast and a high pressure system forms over the desert to the east. This 
reverses the normal wind flow and moves the air westward. The wind moves from the 
high desert to sea level. As it descends the mountains, it is compressed and increases in 
temperature.16   
These hot, and very dry Santa Ana winds—with a relative humidity of 10 to 20 
percent or lower—dry out vegetation, increasing the fuel available to feed fires. The 
gusty winds and eddies of winds swirling through canyons and valleys also fan flames 
and spread burning embers.17  The winds are associated with some of the area's largest 
and deadliest wildfires, including the state's largest fire on record, the Cedar Fire,18 as 
well as the Laguna Fire,19 Old Fire,20 Esperanza Fire,21 Santiago Canyon Fire of 1889,22 
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and the Witch Fire.23  Many years previously, on a similar November morning in 1961, a 
Sherman Oaks construction crew, working just north of Bel-Air, noticed smoke and 
flames coming from a nearby pile of rubbish. Within minutes, Santa Ana winds swept 
burning embers from roof to roof, spreading fire across the affluent enclaves of the Santa 
Monica Mountains. Before it was contained less than two days later, it destroyed nearly 
500 homes worth about $30 million.24  When Santa Ana winds come, firefighters prepare 
for the worst and red flags are raised for warning.25  On September 23, 1970, the Santa 
Ana winds were here. 
By September 27, 1970, 14 major fires were burning out of control. Four separate 
fires had joined into a single massive fire creating a perimeter from Newhall to Malibu. 
Thousands fled their homes in advance of the fire. Los Angeles Fire Department Fire 
Chief Raymond Hill remarked that “we have every piece of civil defense equipment from 
Monterey to the Mexican border on the front lines.” 26 
On September 28, 1970, the Santa Ana winds continued. San Diego County 
reported a 10-mile long wall of flames forcing 10,000 to flee. Two hundred homes were 
destroyed and 17 communities were evacuated. In addition, six other fires were reported 
in San Diego County.27 
By the end of the 13-day period beginning September 22, 1970, 773 wildfires in 
Southern California burned 576,508 acres, destroyed 722 homes, and killed 16 people. 
Although all agencies cooperated to the best of their ability, numerous problems of 
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communication and coordination hampered their effectiveness. The Los Angeles County 
Fire Department had added 30 new fire companies since the disastrous 1958 fires, but the 
1970 fires were fought with the same command and control techniques.28  
After the devastating fire season of 1970, the California fire services were 
severely criticized for failure to provide leadership in solving the issues of cooperation, 
command and control, communications, and training. To address the issue, in 1971, the 
92nd Congress approved funding for the U.S. Forest Service Research to design a system 
that will “Make a quantum jump in the capabilities of Southern California wildland fire 
protection agencies to effectively coordinate interagency action and to allocate 
suppression resources in dynamic, multiple-fire situations.”29 
This federal legislative action authorized funding for a five-year research program 
coordinated by the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES). The 
research began with a group of leaders from California’s largest firefighting agencies, 
including the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the Governor’s 
Office of Emergency Services, Los Angeles, Ventura and the Santa Barbara County Fire 
Departments, and the Los Angeles City Fire Department. In addition, they were joined 
with the U.S. Forest Service. The program was named FIRESCOPE (Firefighting 
Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies) and began the 
joint development of the systems to improve firefighting operations in large-scale 
incidents.30  High-ranking administrative/command-level officers representing federal, 
state and local fire protection agencies in Southern California made up FIRESCOPE’s 
policy board. These officials were of such rank that they could make operational policy 
decisions for their agencies.31  Although the original task force’s early investigation into 
multi-agency operations focused on equipment including radio and hose coupling 
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compatibility, and department emergency operations policies, it soon became obvious to 
FIRESCOPE members that the primary issues actually revolved around the diverse 
missions of the involved agencies, and the divergent nomenclature and organizational 
structures used by the agencies for command of emergency incidents.32 
FIRESCOPE, utilizing the lessons from the 1970 fires, began to explore the 
complexity of incident management in a large or expanding incident, coupled with the 
growing need for multi-agency and multifunctional involvement on incidents. The 
program's foundation revolved around (1) improving fireground operations, (2) 
increasing the effectiveness of fire protection agencies, and (3) improving multi-agency 
coordination. They determined that there was an increased need for a single standard 
incident management system that can be used by all emergency response disciplines.33  
FIRESCOPE determined that an effective fire management system must contain the 
following elements: 
• Coordinate multi-agency resources during major incidents. 
• Develop improved methods for forecasting fire behavior. 
• Develop standard terminology.  
• Provide multi-agency communications.  
• Provide multi-agency training.34 
These five basic elements were consolidated into two components that would 
make up the FIRESCOPE system, namely: 
• Incident Command System for improving incident management.  
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• Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS) for improving multi-agency 
coordination for major or multiple incidents.35 
The Incident Command System is used to organize on-scene operations for a 
broad spectrum of emergencies from small to complex incidents, both natural and 
manmade. The field response level is where emergency management/response personnel, 
under the command of an appropriate authority, carry out tactical decisions and activities 
in direct response to an incident or threat. ICS is founded upon a number of key concepts, 
including:  
• Unity of Command (Chain of Command) 
• Clear Text (Common Terminology) 
• Management by Objective 
• Flexible/Modular Organization 
• Span-of-Control 
Coordination on any incident or event is possible and effective due to the 
implementation of the following concepts: 
• Incident Action Plan 
• Comprehensive Resource Management 
• Integrated Communications 
An incident command system must be able to meet the requirements of an 
expanding incident, and remain easy to use and flexible to meet the requirements of all 
types of incidents.36 
The need for an interagency coordinating mechanism had been recognized long 
before the 1970 fires. National events had a strong influence in focusing this need. The 
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1973 "America Burning" Task Force Report, which strongly urged a single national 
firefighting concept that was not to be in the wildland fire community.37  These issues 
and the fires of 1970, 1971, and 1973 stimulated the formation of the National Wildfire 
Coordinating Group.  
The National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) is made up of the USDA 
Forest Service; four Department of the Interior agencies: Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM), National Park Service (NPS), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS); and State forestry agencies through the National Association of 
State Foresters. The purpose of NWCG was to coordinate programs of the participating 
wildfire management agencies so as to avoid wasteful duplication and to provide a means 
of constructively working together. The NWCG provided a formalized system to agree 
upon standards of training, equipment, qualifications, and other operational functions.38 
By 1976, the FIRESCOPE agencies formally agreed on ICS common terminology 
and procedures. The ICS was born. Later that year, limited field-testing began. By 1978, 
parts of the ICS were successfully used on several wildland fire incidents and applied to 
urban firefighting. That year, ICS was formally adopted by the Los Angeles City Fire 
Department as the incident management structure for all incidents. Another key 
component of the Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS) was approved that same 
year.39 
ICS was formally adopted by the California Department of Forestry and Fire 
Protection (CDF), the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES), partner agencies, 
and endorsed by the State Board of Fire Services in 1980. In addition, a FIRESCOPE ICS 
training course development began with the objective of satisfying the needs of local, 
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state and federal agencies. In 1980, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) 
began to perform an analysis of ICS for possible national application.40 
In 1981, adaptation of ICS began to expand and create wide use throughout 
Southern California by major fire agencies. CDF and the OES and the California State 
Fire Marshal all signed a “Statement of Intent,” establishing a mutual commitment to 
support FIRESCOPE and the ICS Program. Also, many agencies began to utilize ICS on 
non-fire incidents. Also, the FIRESCOPE Board of Directors approved a response to 
NWCG, which generally supported the national adoption of a uniform emergency 
management organization, referred to, as the National Interagency Incident Management 
System (NIIMS). NIIMS contains basically the FIRESCOPE ICS.41 
In 1982, the NWCG forwarded and accepted the recommendation for developing 
the ICS for national application, and the U.S. Forest Service approved implementation of 
ICS in the Pacific Southwest Region (Region 5) by 1983, and service-wide use by 
1985.42 
1. First Interstate Fire 
On Wednesday, May 4, and continuing into May 5, 1988, the Los Angeles City 
Fire Department responded to and extinguished the most challenging and difficult 
highrise fire in the city’s history. The fire destroyed four floors and damaged a fifth floor 
of the modern 62-story First Interstate Bank building in downtown Los Angeles. The fire 
claimed one life, injured approximately 35 occupants and 14 fire personnel, and resulted 
in a property loss of over $50 million. 43 
A total of 383 Los Angeles City Fire Department members from 64 companies, 
nearly one-half of the on-duty force of the entire city, were involved in fighting the fire, 
                                                 









mounting an offensive attack via four stairways. This operation involved many unusual 
challenges, but is most notable for the sheer magnitude of the fire and the fact that the fire 
was successfully controlled by interior suppression efforts. 
The Highrise Incident Command System was initiated, with companies assigned 
to fire attack, and to logistics and support functions from the outset. The U.S. Fire 
Administration report stated that the Highrise Incident Command System was very 
effective in managing the incident. Despite the massive numbers of companies and 
firefighters on the scene, the fire department maintained good organization at the scene 
and effectively—and safely—managed their resources.44  
Concurrent to the development of ICS, Fire Chief Alan Brunacini was developing 
the Fire Ground Command (FGC) System in Phoenix, Arizona. The system emphasized 
structural firefighting applications and other urban-related emergencies such as hazardous 
materials, mass casualty, and other incident types. The National Fire Protection 
Association adopted FGC and published several related training materials.  
Throughout the 1980s, fire service leaders debated the benefits of each system 
and the possibilities of merging the best components of the two into a single system. 
During the 1989 International Association of Fire Chiefs annual conference in 
Indianapolis, a panel discussion was conducted on the merger possibilities. Based on 
comments from the audience, there appeared to be strong support for a merger 
In July 1990, the first of a series of committee meetings was held with Phoenix 
Fire Department and FIRESCOPE representatives. In attendance were representatives 
from the National Fire Academy. Additional committee meetings were held in September 
1990 and January 1991. A pivotal meeting between the committee and the FIRESCOPE 
board of directors occurred in August 1991. As additional meetings occurred, more and 
more fire service organizations participated, thus increasing representation. During the 
August 1991 meeting, the committee was re-organized into a more formalized 
organization. The organization selected the title “National Fire Service Incident 
                                                 




Management System Consortium” (NIMS Consortium) to better describe the 
organization’s mission. During February 1993, the NIMS Consortium completed the 
successful merger of ICS and FGC. The title “Incident Management System (IMS)” was 
chosen to identify the merger.45 The NIMS Consortium and FIRESCOPE continue to 
have members sit on each others respective boards to ensure collaboration. 
2. Law Enforcement 
ICS existed for nearly ten years before the law enforcement community began to 
study and embrace the concept. In the early 1980s, law enforcement leaders in Southern 
California recognized the benefit of adapting the fire service’s ICS to meet the needs of 
large-scale law enforcement activities. The Police Officers Standards and Testing (POST) 
organization sanctioned the Law Enforcement ICS (LEICS) development, providing 
reimbursement for LEICS classes taught to law enforcement personnel.46  The first major 
incident management under LEICS was a Pacific Southwest Airlines plane crash in a 
rural part of San Luis Obispo County.47  Sheriff’s personnel credited LEICS for its ability 
to manage this event, involving law, fire, and medical personnel from a variety of 
jurisdictions. LEICS became the basis for the law enforcement and public safety services 
planning for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. This Olympics involved more than 
one hundred local law enforcement agencies, and more than a dozen federal law and 
military organizations.48  
Law enforcement agencies generally do not face emergencies of such enormous 
scale; police agencies seldom must provide such extensive mutual aid to each other. As a 
result, many law enforcement managers understandably view their incident response 
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systems, often developed in isolation from one another, as effective. However, the 1984 
Los Angeles Olympics and subsequent events, both planned and spontaneous, stimulated 
progressive law enforcement leaders to search for more efficient ways to integrate not 
only allied police agencies but also other disciplines, such as fire and EMS, at the scene 
of a crisis. While an individual agency's protocols and procedures may have worked well 
for years, the need for some standardization quickly became apparent when agencies 
were forced to integrate their resources rapidly during the response to a major incident.49   
3. Oakland Hills Fire 
Between 1986 and 1991, most of California experienced drought conditions. This 
situation was recognized as creating more and more critical fire risk conditions each year. 
The drought conditions prevailed through October 1991 with warmer than normal 
temperatures. On Saturday, October 19, 1991, the weather was warm, clear, and dry, with 
no appreciable wind. At 1212 hours, a brush fire was reported on the hillside in the East 
Bay Hills Fire, near Oakland, California. The fire was attacked from the lower side by 
Oakland Fire Department fire companies on Buckingham and Westmoorland and from 
above by companies on Marlborough Terrace. The tactics were successful and the fire 
was declared under control at 1339 hours. The fire area was limited to two acres, with no 
structural involvement, and it was stopped on the uphill slope, before reaching the top of 
the hill.50 
A Diablo wind condition was predicted for Sunday, October 20, and red flag 
warnings were issued to area fire agencies.51  The coastal areas of southern California are 
extremely vulnerable to the infamous Santa Ana wind. A similar condition occurs in the 
Oakland area, where it is known as a Diablo (or “Devil”) wind. These winds are created 
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when a high-pressure weather system is located over the great basin of the inland western 
States, accompanied by an offshore low-pressure system.52 
Sunday morning, October 20, brought the classic Diablo wind conditions to the 
Oakland area. The Oakland Fire Department assistant chief, who had also worked the 
previous day’s fire, recognized the danger and directed two engine companies to check 
the burn area. Arriving at the top of the hill, at 0913, he advised Oakland Fire 
Communications to again call East Bay Regional Parks and request their assistance in 
overhauling several hot spots that were flaring-up on the hillside. East Bay Regional 
Parks District (EBRPD) has its own career fire department and participates in the mutual 
aid system. 
The Oakland and EBRPD units were having difficulty coordinating their efforts, 
since each agency’s units were on their own radio channels. Passing messages via the 
dispatchers, then by telephone from one communications center to the other, proved to be 
a problem. The units from both agencies were directed to use the “White” (mutual aid) 
channel to communicate directly. Between 1040 and 1050 hours, the wind velocity 
increased and several additional flare-ups were observed; the crews were kept busy 
moving up and down the steep slope to cover them. Very suddenly, the fire flared up in 
an unburned area on the lower east flank of the burn area. Burning embers had been 
carried from one of the hot spots into a patch of timber dry brush. The fire was spreading 
rapidly uphill, and the strong wind coming over the ridge was pushing the flames out to 
both flanks at the same time. 
Between 1119 and 1125 hours the situation became even worse The fire was 
spreading south and east on the right flank toward a cluster of homes on Grizzly Peak 
Terrace  The incident commander called for the fifth and sixth alarms at 1120 hours. At 
1133 hours, the incident commander instructed Oakland Fire Communications to request  
 
 
                                                 





five strike teams from Alameda County. He reported that the fire was totally out of 
control and moving on several fronts, involving more than 100 acres of trees, brush, and 
houses. 
The strike teams that had been requested earlier were beginning to arrive by 1300 
hours. Most had difficulty reaching their assigned destinations and establishing contact 
with the command structure. At 1359 hours, Oakland requested 13 additional strike 
teams, 6 air tankers, and 6 helicopter attack units. Around 1600 hours, implementation of 
the ICS on a large scale began to bring the incident into focus at the command post. Prior 
to this point, Oakland and Berkeley had each operated independently, with their own 
command posts. 
The fire spread rapidly throughout the day and only slowed as the day ended and 
the winds died down. This allowed some situational awareness to be obtained. Crews 
continued to contain the fire through the next days with some crews remaining on the 
lines continuously. 
The fire was declared as contained on Tuesday morning. After the full area was 
surveyed for damage assessment, the number of people left homeless was estimated at 
close to 10,000, and damage estimates exceeded $1.5 billion. The actual number of 
structures destroyed was eventually determined to be 3,354 single family dwellings and 
456 apartment units. Approximately 2,000 burned vehicles were also located in the area. 
In the end, 25 lives were lost, including a battalion chief and a police officer. 
The management of an incident of this size and complexity was a tremendous 
challenge. From the beginning of the incident, the situation expanded and changed more 
rapidly than the suppression forces could communicate, obtain reinforcements, and get 
organized. Almost 800 structures were ignited within the first hour and more than 300 per 
hour for the next seven hours. These factors created a situation that exceeded all previous 
experience with ICS or any other incident management system. 
After the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, the Oakland Fire Department placed an 




mutual aid. The ICS was used for this fire, but the shortage of command officers and the 
extremely fast escalation of the incident made it very difficult to develop the organization 
in proportion to the situation. 
When the fire spread into the city of Berkeley, yet another independent command 
structure was established, with the Berkeley Fire Department units utilizing their own 
radio system. This meant that there were two “primary” incident commands and two 
“secondary” commands, working with four separate communications centers and unable 
to effectively communicate with each other. 
The San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) later established an additional 
“secondary” command post and coordinated its resource requirements back to the SFFD 
Communications Center using their own radio system. Units that were unable to 
communicate took actions on their own initiative and were not under the control of the 
Incident Commander. As one Oakland Fire Department command officer commented 
“It’s hard to get organized and run for your life at the same time!” 
The Oakland Hills Fire was the largest response ever recorded. Massive mutual 
aid was provided by 440 engine companies, 1,539 firefighters and 250 agencies. The 
equivalent to a 107-alarm fire helped control the inferno. The established mutual aid 
systems among cities, within counties, and on the regional and statewide levels provided 
an unprecedented amount of assistance to Oakland and Berkeley for this incident. 88 
strike teams were mobilized, some from more than 350 miles away. 
The 1991 Oakland disaster was not just a fire problem. Law enforcement, public 
works and utilities, the National Guard, health and safety services, and relief agencies 
encountered crushing difficulties. None of these organizations shared a common 
organizational system or compatible command structure. The Oakland Hills Fire pointed 
out the need for a common emergency management system throughout local and state 
government for use by all agencies with a first-responder role associated with public 
safety.53   
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As a result of the Oakland Hills Fire, a law was passed by the legislature to 
improve the coordination of state and local emergency response in California. The statute 
directed OES, in coordination with other state agencies and interested local emergency 
management agencies, to establish by regulation the Standardized Emergency 
Management System (SEMS). State agencies and local governments are required to use 
SEMS to participate in disasters.54  SEMS required the use of ICS for all public safety 
agencies in California. 
When examining the ICS, research found that Australia has common issues with 
the United States in wildfires, expanding populations in the urban/wildland interface, and 
incident management. Australia has similar government emergency response structures 
where incidents are first handled locally. If incidents expand, mutual aid procedures are 
utilized, and then state and national resources are applied. Australia had the same needs 
for an incident management as the United States and utilized the United States ICS as its 
model. 
Australia has had numerous major brushfires in its history. The Black Friday fires 
of January 1939, in Victoria, Australia, were considered one of the worst natural 
brushfires in the world, and certainly the single worst in Australian history as a measure 
of land affected. Almost 20,000 square kilometers (an area about the size of New Jersey) 
of land was burned and 71 people died.55  
Significant fires have been a constant since then. The longest official continuous 
brushfire in New South Wales (NSW) occurred between December 21, 2001, and January 
13, 2002. Widespread severe wildfires burned throughout much of NSW during extreme 
weather conditions.56  A total of 121 homes were destroyed. Approximately 10,000 
people were evacuated and 15,000 firefighters from across Australia and New Zealand 
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were deployed to fight up to 100 large fires for over three weeks, as hot, mainly north-
westerly winds and very dry conditions persisted.57 58   
Through these and other events, Australia developed the Australasian Inter-
Service Incident Management System (AIIMS). The AIIMS is the nationally recognized 
system of organizational principles and structure used to manage wildfires and other large 
emergencies (e.g., Floods, Storms and Cyclones etc.) utilizing the All Agencies 
approach.59  The AIIMS was developed by a committee under the auspices of the then 
Australian Association of Rural Fire Authorities, since amalgamated into the Australasian 
Fire Authorities Council in the late 1980s. The system developed by the Australian 
Association of Rural Fire Authorities was based on the United States National 
Interagency Incident Management System with modifications to suit the Australian 
environment. One of the most significant of these was to call the core operational 
component of the AIIMS, the Incident Control System, in contrast to the United States 
Incident Command System.60  This change was to make the terminology used in the 
AIIMS compliant with existing Australian definitions of command and control. Since 
command was defined as functioning vertically within organizations and control as 
functioning horizontally across organizations, the use of control was more appropriate in 
the Australian context. AIIMS has since been adopted by the various State Emergency 
Services and a number of other public safety organizations to be the standard in 
Australian emergency response.  
As it was developed, AIIMS was an application of Incident Command System, 
which was claimed to be robust, scalable, and a widely applicable system for dealing with 
                                                 
57 “Attorney-General’s Department Disasters Database: Black Christmas Brushfire,” Available at. 
http://www.disasters.ema.gov.au/Browse%20Details/DisasterEventDetails.aspx?DisasterEventID=1320.  
58 “Attorney-General’s Department Disasters Database,” Available at 
http://www.em.gov.au/Resources/Pages/DisastersDatabase.aspx. 
59 Julian Yates, “Improving the Management of Emergencies: Enhancing the ICS.” Australian Journal 





all manner of complex incidents and emergencies.61  It accomplished this by having 
various “sectors” “divisions,” and “commanders,” which can be expanded and contracted 
dependent on the size of the “emergency.”  AIIMS was designed to be very similar to the 
Incident Command System with an Incident Controller, Logistics Section, Operations 
Section and a Planning Section. 
Both the United States and Australian command systems had a Public Information 
Officer assigned to the command staff and a Communication Unit within the Logistics 
Section. 
4. Oklahoma City Bombing 
On April 19, 1995, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, terrorism struck when a bomb 
exploded in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. Government and other 
responders were on the scene minutes after a massive truck bomb destroyed a federal 
building. The ICS was utilized and one person was appointed as incident commander, 
responsible for directing all other responders. An after-action report argued that the 
‘‘Oklahoma City Bombing should be viewed as ultimate proof that the Incident 
Command System works.”62  As a result of its perceived success in situations like 
Oklahoma, the ICS was viewed favorably by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) for all crisis situations. 
5. Federal Adaption 
The United States Coast Guard issued Commandant Instruction 3120.1 on 
September 28, 1998. This instruction directed all Coast Guard units to adopt a 
standardized response management system for Coast Guard contingency response 
actions. All officers were to ensure that all personnel involved in response actions are 
familiar with, and trained in, the use of the National Interagency Incident Management 
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System (NIIMS)-based ICS. In addition, all contingency plans shall use an ICS structure 
in their response organization and management procedures.63 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks highlighted the need to focus on 
improving emergency management, incident response capabilities, and coordination 
processes across the country. A comprehensive national approach, applicable at all 
jurisdictional levels and across functional disciplines, would improve the effectiveness of 
emergency management/response personnel across the full spectrum of potential 
incidents and hazard scenarios (including but not limited to natural hazards, terrorist 
activities, and other manmade disasters). Such an approach was needed to improve 
coordination and cooperation between public and private agencies/organizations in a 
variety of emergency management and incident response activities. 64 
To address this deficiency, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD) 5 in February 2003.65  The goal of Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” was to enhance the ability of the 
United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive 
national incident management system. HSPD 5 directed the Secretary of the Department 
of Homeland Security to develop, submit for review to the Homeland Security Council, 
and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is to provide a 
consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work 
effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic 
incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. 
HSPD 5 required all federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS and to use 
it in their individual incident management programs and activities, as well as in support 
of all actions taken to assist state, tribal, and local governments. HSPD 5 mandated that 
beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, federal departments and agencies shall adopt NIMS. The 
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directive required federal departments and agencies to make adoption of NIMS by state, 
tribal, and local organizations a condition for federal preparedness assistance (through 
grants, contracts, and other activities). The Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security was directed to develop standards and guidelines for determining whether a state 
or local entity has adopted NIMS.66 
One of the most important “best practices” that has been incorporated into the 
NIMS was the ICS. ICS was established by NIMS as the standardized incident 
organizational structure for the management of all incidents.67  
6. Katrina 
On August 28, 2005, Hurricane Katrina was in the Gulf of Mexico where it 
powered up to a Category 5 storm on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale, packing winds 
estimated at 175 mph. When Katrina made landfall at 7:10 a.m. on August 29, in 
southern Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, it had calmed down to a Category 3 hurricane. 
Maximum winds were estimated near 125 mph to the east of the center.68 The storm 
passed through New Orleans leaving damage in its wake. Tropical storm-force winds and 
rain extended as far east as the Florida panhandle. A wall of water surged ashore in 
coastal areas.69 
Although the storm surge was highest to the east of the path of the eye of Katrina, 
a very significant storm surge also occurred west of the path of the eye. As the level of 
Lake Pontchartrain rose, several feet of water were pushed into communities along its 
northeastern shore in St. Tammany Parish from Slidell to Mandeville, Louisiana. High 
watermark data indicate the storm surge was 12 to 16 feet in those areas. The surge 
overtopped large sections of the levees east of New Orleans, in Orleans Parish, and St. 
Bernard Parish, and it also pushed water up the Intracoastal Waterway and into the 
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Industrial Canal. The water rise in Lake Pontchartrain strained the floodwalls along the 
canals adjacent to its southern shore, including the 17th Street Canal and the London 
Avenue Canal. Breaches along the Industrial Canal east of downtown New Orleans, the 
London Avenue Canal north of downtown, and the 17th Street Canal northwest of 
downtown appear to have occurred during the early morning on August 29. Eventually, 
about 80 percent of the city of New Orleans flooded, to varying depths up to about 20 
feet.70 
More than 1.5 million people were directly affected and more than 800,000 
citizens were forced to live outside of their homes. This was the largest displacement of 
people since the great Dust Bowl migrations of the 1930s.71 The total number of 
fatalities, to be either directly or indirectly related to Katrina, is 1,833. Most of the deaths 
in Louisiana were directly caused by the widespread storm surge-induced flooding and its 
miserable aftermath in the New Orleans area. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which hit one month later, were two of the most 
intense hurricanes ever recorded in the nation’s history. The storms had a massive 
physical impact on the land, affecting 90,000 square miles, an area the size of Great 
Britain. 72 
Government officials at all levels were unprepared for the consequences of the 
New Orleans levee breaks. The breaks that inundated the city with floodwater, 
incapacitated first responders, and stranded the 20 percent of residents who had not 
evacuated. The breaks pushed the status of Katrina from a bad storm to a catastrophic 
incident. 73 
The response to Hurricane Katrina did not go well. The Incident Command 
System was not applied well and not at all in some locations. A coordinated unified 
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command was not established. Responders were overwhelmed. Local, state, and federal 
authorities did not understand what was happening and thus did not initially share critical 
information, quickly organize the response effort, take needed initiative, or work 
effectively with the media to get the facts to the people.74  Additional challenges 
contributed to failed rapid response. Most significant was that policy and law placed the 
federal government largely in a supplemental role for natural disasters. Federal law (the 
Constitution, Stafford Act, and Insurrection Act) put state leadership at the center of 
incident management and tied federal response to specific state requests. The overall 
relief effort was framed by the National Response Plan (NRP), which called for a 
sequential reaction: local, then state, then federal.75 
7. Deepwater Horizon 
On the evening of April 20, 2010, a gas release and subsequent explosion 
occurred on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig working on the Macondo exploration well for 
BP southeast of Venice, Louisiana, in the Gulf of Mexico. The fire burned for 36 hours 
before the rig sank, and hydrocarbons leaked into the Gulf of Mexico for 87 days before 
the well was closed and sealed.76 
On April 23, the Coast Guard established a robust Incident Command System 
response in accordance with the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan (NCP). The ICS provided a common command and control framework 
to develop and implement tactical plans to effectively manage a multi-agency response to 
emergencies. The ICS organization for this response included Incident Command Posts 
and Unified Commands at the local level and a Unified Area Command at the regional 
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level, and consisted of representatives from the Coast Guard, other federal, state, and 
local agencies, as well as BP as the primary responsible party.77  
Overall, the incident command structure functioned appropriately; however, with 
an incident spreading across hundreds of miles of coastline, issues occurred.  
In testimony, Craig Paul Taffaro Jr. stated that of significant importance was the 
clear indication that the response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill crisis started from a 
position of playing catch up. From the breaking notice that an explosion had occurred 
many weeks later, the information flow to the local branch was wrought with 
inconsistency, fragmented messaging, and stove-piped communication patterns. He stated 
that for the first six weeks of the response, despite an approved joint command and 
incident command team being built, a separate and uncoordinated effort was the norm.78  
This lack of continuity was addressed by the local community by establishing a 
deputy lead in all ICS sections, which was also attempted to be undone at various times 
throughout the rotation of BP and Coast Guard personnel. As branch directors, deputies, 
PPLOs, and other subject matter experts from the Coast Guard and/or BP contractors 
rotated into the St. Bernard Parish Branch, a constant learning curve was experienced, 
and a re-tooling of operational, logistical, planning, and resourcing activities became the 
norm. This contention often was the result of an Incident Command in Houma not 
recognizing the operational input and planning of the local branch in St. Bernard Parish. 
79 
Taffaro stated:  
We recognize that a basic tenet of disaster response is that disasters are 
local. To exclude local engagement curtails critical information and 
hinders the process of an expedited response. While following a National 
Contingency Plan may set the specific command parameters and structure, 
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if implemented without local buy-in initiates significant but unnecessary 
power struggles, stifles valuable information exchange, breeds distrust, 
and ultimately interferes with the effective completion of the mission at 
hand via distractions which focus on personality and authority dynamics.80 
Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger, Deputy National Incident Commander for the 
Deepwater Horizon incident, stated that the Deepwater Horizon event displayed that 
work is needed with all the agencies to review the National Contingency Plan and the 
National Response Framework to identify national-level issues to enhance our ability to 
provide a coordinated, whole of government response to major incidents.81 
The ICS has grown, evolved, and matured from the early days when FIRESCOPE 
was formed. The ICS has changed to include an all-risk environment that all agencies can 
use. Through that evolution, ICS has spread from Southern California, to the State of 
California, and then throughout the Nation. ICS will continue to change to meet the 
challenges of the ever-evolving threat environment. The events of Katrina and Deepwater 
Horizon have shown that the Incident Command System needs further work to ensure 
that it can work efficiently and effectively for the betterment of the citizens it is intended 
to protect. The following chapter explores the literature of the ICS. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It’s hard to get organized and run for your life at the same time!  
Oakland Fire Department command officer at Oakland Hills Fire 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Literature pertaining to the topics being explored in this thesis falls into three 
primary categories. First, there is the literature that the federal government has published 
identifying and describing the Incident Command System. Much of this literature has 
appeared in the wake of the September 11 attacks against civilian targets in the cities of 
New York, Washington, and Somerset County, Pennsylvania. This body of recent work 
describes the ICS and outlines the mandatory shift in emergency management protocols. 
Second, there is the body of literature that describes the growth and maturation of 
the ICS. This literature discusses and debates some of the questions about the ICS that 
will resurface in later years. Some of these topics have not had sufficient discourse. This 
is the body of literature that questions the applicability of ICS to the range of crisis 
responses. This literature made its appearance relatively quickly following the 
development of ICS in California in the 1970s, but developed more during the 1990s. Its 
emphasis is sector-based, in that its core assertion challenges the effectiveness of NIMS/ 
ICS for all type of emergency incidents. 
Third, there is a scholarly body of literature, drawing on the work of the Disaster 
Research Center. In it, Arnold Howett, Dutch Leonard, and others question the ability of 
NIMS/ ICS to function equally well across all emergent situations, across the response 
spectrum. This literature is important to our discussion because NIMS and ICS was 
established, by the federal government, as the singular solution to crisis management in 




1. Federal Literature 
Integration of ICS as the national model for emergency management was initiated 
in February, 2003, when President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 5. The goal of HSPD 5 “Management of Domestic Incidents,” was to enhance 
the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, 
comprehensive national incident management system. HSPD 5 directed the Secretary of 
the Department of Homeland Security to develop, submit for review to the Homeland 
Security Council, and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
NIMS is to provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, and local 
governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.82  HSPD 5 
required all federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS and to use it in their 
individual incident management programs and activities, as well as in support of all 
actions taken to assist state, tribal, and local governments. HSPD 5 mandated that 
beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, federal departments and agencies shall adopt NIMS. 
Following HSPD 5, the Department of Homeland Security released the NIMS on 
March 1, 2004.83  The NIMS describes the ICS and its component parts. NIMS 
incorporated the best practices currently in use by the emergency response community. In 
the introductory letter signed by Tom Ridge, the first Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security states that NIMS had undergone extensive vetting within the federal 
family and also included a development process with extensive outreach to state, local 
and tribal officials, to the emergency response community, and to private officials.84  
The federal government had already been using the ICS within some departments. 
The United States Forest Service approved implementation of ICS in the Pacific 
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Southwest Region by 1983, and implemented it service wide by 1985.85  In 1989, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established the National Urban Search 
and Rescue (US&R) Response System as a framework for combining local emergency 
services personnel into integrated disaster response task forces. These task forces, 
designated as federal resources, were to be deployed through the Response Directorate of 
FEMA. The task forces were the primary response asset at FEMA.86  The task forces, 
developed primarily from fire departments around the nation, brought their ICS with 
them and integrated it into the federal response. In 1992, the federal government accepted 
ICS as the incident management system with the adaption of the Federal Response 
Plan.87  The Federal Response Plan described the structure for organizing, coordination, 
and mobilizing federal resources to augment state and local response efforts under the 
Stafford Act. The ICS was identified as the structure for integrating those federal 
resources.  
A key component of NIMS is the outline of the NIMS National Integration 
Center. The National Integration Center is responsible for facilitating the development 
and adoption of national-level standards, guidelines, and protocols related to the NIMS.88  
The National Integration Center provides strategic direction for and oversight of NIMS 
and continuous refinement of the system and its components over the long term. 
Revisions to NIMS, ICS and other issues can be proposed by any and all NIMS users.  
Accompanying the NIMS, was the National Response Plan (NRP).89  The NRP 
was to address activities related to domestic incident management, including prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery actions. The NRP focused on those activities that 
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are directly related to an evolving incident or potential incident. The NRP broke new 
ground in integrating all levels of government in a common incident management 
framework.  
Due to issues raised after the response to Hurricane Katrina and the hurricane 
season of 2005, the National Response Plan was updated and recreated as the National 
Response Framework (NRF) in 2008.90  Changes were made to the NRP that were both 
structural and significant. The Department of Homeland Security was advised that NRP 
were bureaucratic and repetitive. Users also suggested the NRP was still insufficiently 
national in its focus, which is to say that it should speak more clearly to the roles and 
responsibilities of all parties involved in response. Clearly, it was evident that the NRP 
and its supporting documents did not constitute a true operational plan in the sense 
understood by emergency managers. The National Response Plan did not live up to the 
promise of its title. 
The NRF was intended to be a more of a framework to guide the effective 
response to an incident is a shared responsibility of governments at all levels, the private 
sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individual citizens. The NRF 
took the experience gained since the 1992 Federal Response Plan (FRP) through the 2004 
NRP combined with intervening incidents to create a more mature plan for all incidents. 
With the NRF came numerous other documents, like the updated NIMS91 and 
National Incident Management System: Five-Year NIMS Training Plan.92  Together, 
these documents describe to foundation of incident management and ICS.  
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2. Growth and Maturation of the ICS 
The ICS grew out of necessity, due to a series of incidents in the 1970s, and was 
primarily developed to handle the large fires in the west. It represented a significant 
departure from previous large-scale emergency coordination methods where ad hoc 
networks were put together and had to work through their differences on-site.93  By 1978, 
parts of the ICS were successfully used on several wildland fire incidents and applied to 
urban firefighting. That year, ICS was formally adopted by the Los Angeles Fire 
Department as the incident management structure for all incidents.94  ICS soon spread 
across the fire service and through the fire service’s response spectrum. 
Additional command and control systems were developed over the years, 
including the Fireground Command System (FGC) developed by the Phoenix, Arizona 
Fire Department and the National Fire Service Incident Management System.95  The 
concepts of FGC were similar to ICS, although there were differences in terminology and 
in organizational structure. The FGC system was developed for structural firefighting and 
was designed for operations of 25 or fewer companies.96  
Recognizing the continuing challenges occurring in the fire service in applying a 
common approach to incident command, the National Fire Service Incident Management 
System (IMS) Consortium was created in 1990. Its purpose was to create consensus 
towards developing a single command system. The consortium consisted of many 
individual fire service leaders, representatives of most major fire service organizations 
and representatives of federal, state and local agencies, including FIRESCOPE and the 
Phoenix Fire Department. One of the significant outcomes of the consortium's work was 
an agreement on the need to develop operational protocols within ICS, so that responders 
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would be able to apply the ICS as one common system. In 1993, the IMS consortium 
completed its first document: Model Procedures Guide for Structural Firefighting.97  The 
National Fire Academy, having already adopted the ICS in 1980, incorporated this 
material into its training curriculum as well. 
The 911 Commission report was very clear about the direction the nation should 
take when is recommended that emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt 
the Incident Command System.98  The report gives credit to the ICS at the Pentagon 
response. It states that the emergency response at the Pentagon represented a mix of local, 
state, and federal jurisdictions and was generally effective. It overcame the inherent 
complications of a response across jurisdictions because of the Incident Command 
System.99   
However, a point that the 911 Commission brought up was communication. It 
stated that the inability to communicate was a critical element at the World Trade Center, 
Pentagon, and Somerset County, Pennsylvania, crash sites, where multiple agencies and 
multiple jurisdictions responded. The occurrence of this problem at three very different 
sites is strong evidence that compatible and adequate communications among public 
safety organizations at the local, state, and federal levels remains an important 
problem.100  Communication is a function the ICS; communication failure could be an 
inherent fault of the system and should be a point of further debate. 
3. Scholarly Literature 
Wenger et al. asked in 1989 if the Incident Command System is the ideal model 
for all emergency management.101  They identified serious difficulties in the ICS. First 
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was the concept that ICS had become a buzzword within emergency management that 
bears little relationship to the detailed management model. Many departments claim to 
use the ICS, however, during actual emergencies; the plan is either ignored or is utilized 
in a very limited fashion. Furthermore, while many departments have some knowledge of 
the concepts, few understand the complexities and purposes of the system. Another issue 
they have with ICS is communications. Case studies indicated that communication 
systems failed due to overload. Communication between units, and command posts and 
communication centers, were lost.102  They state that before jumping on the ICS 
“bandwagon,” careful, critical analysis of the model must be undertaken. It should be 
adapted and implemented with care.103  These arguments were well grounded at the time. 
However, in 1989, ICS was in its infancy and many organizations were new to the system 
or were only beginning the transition. These criticisms may seem premature. Wenger et 
al., stated that ICS is far from perfect. They continued that, as is the case with any rapidly 
growing technology, the adoption of ICS by new user groups is rarely painless or 
seamless. For example, few fire departments have escaped the "growing pains" that 
inevitably accompany the initial integration of ICS into traditional operational 
environments.104  
Research displayed a dearth of critical examinations of the issues raised by 
Wenger et al. Outside of the fire service, little research on the ICS was completed. Prior 
to 1989, literature on police activity during community emergencies and disasters was 
very limited.105   
In 1998, Quarantelli again critiqued ICS and described the widespread adaption of 
the ICS as “a fad.” He stated that ICS use, pushed by the fire service, as an 
organization/operational model for disaster management had not been supported with 
                                                 
102 Dennis Wenger, E. L. Quarantelli, and Russell R Dynes, “Disaster Analysis: Police and Fire 
Departments.” Disaster Research Center, 1989.  
103 Ibid., 164. 
104 Dennis Wenger, E. L. Quarantelli, and Russell R Dynes, “Is the Incident Command System a Plan 
for All Seasons and Emergency Solutions.” Hazard Monthly, May 1990.” 
105 Dennis Wenger, E. L. Quarantelli, and Russell R Dynes, “Disaster Analysis: Police and Fire 




empirical evidence and may not be a good idea.106. Federal literature does not address the 
concerns of Quarantelli. ICS had gained momentum and serious debate was limited. The 
greatest strength of the Incident Command System is that it's widely known; its greatest 
weakness is that ICS is not widely understood.107  
For the fire service, ICS was a creative, even necessary, managerial invention that 
addressed core professional problems. It made good sense to train and exercise all 
personnel in the system and use it regularly even when responding to small events. ICS 
became virtually second nature when emergent crises made it essential.  
Howitt and Leonard declared that for law enforcement in the U.S., the need for 
ICS was less certain. Comparing policing to firefighting, they noted that active field co-
ordination involving significant numbers of officers occurs much less regularly (though it 
does occur, for example, in security for large events, hostage situations, and drug arrests). 
Collaboration with mutual aid providers from other jurisdictions is quite rare. Howitt and 
Leonard continue that law enforcement’s need for ICS may seem less compelling than 
the fire service, and the costs of preparing personnel and the organization as a whole may 
seem more burdensome, perhaps unjustified. They continue that, other response 
professions, particularly public health and hospital-based emergency medicine, may for 
varying reasons, find it difficult to identify the key operational questions for which ICS is 
the answer.108  Moody states that the NIMS-based model alone, when considering the 
current National Response Scenarios, seems ill suited for response to acts of paramilitary 
terrorism. American law enforcement may require a supplemental response paradigm that 
envisions an effective initial response when faced with degraded communications 
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capabilities and uncertain command and control structures.109 NIMS and ICS are 
important tools that can be adapted to establish command and control in coordinating 
aspects of the response and recovery phases of many major incidents, including some 
types of terrorist attacks. Moody questions that these command and control paradigms, 
however, are heavily reliant on communications technology and other social and 
organizational preconditions, and may fail to adequately support the initial law 
enforcement response to some types of incidents, such as the attacks that occurred in 
Mumbai, India and Lahore, Pakistan.110   
The National Incident Management System Consortium states that since the 
establishment of the NIMS by the Homeland Security Department, law enforcement 
agencies across the nation have diligently made efforts to comply with the spirit, 
intention and letter of the directives. Efforts to develop congruence with NIMS include 
the incorporation of the principles of the ICS into basic police academy curriculum, 
integration into daily activities, and special operations across the nation.111  
However, Howett also describes ICS as a proven versatile incident management 
tool that is effective in diverse settings.112  He stated that “from the birthplace of ICS in 
California to the National Fire Academy and FEMA, the consensus among long-time 
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diffusion of ICS and NIMS has not been completed in many jurisdictions. Many have not 
previously used the system, and many professional disciplines have been unaware or 
unenthusiastic.114  
Buck et al. raise concerns expressed that ICS has limitations in serving as a model 
for disaster response.115  Research has identified various limitations in the ICS’s model 
serving for all hazards. These limitations include the following: (a) network governance, 
(b) integrating conduct of multiple response organizations, (c) and integrating on 
nongovernmental agencies. They continue that the inability of ICS to accommodate 
easily the inclusion of nongovernment agencies, whether they are private corporations or 
nonprofit entities, is a continuing weakness that has not been satisfactorily addressed 
since the ICS system was implemented. The potential limitations of the ICS as a 
command and control system are further identified by Buck et al., who observed that 
“ICS, as is true for all rational forms of organization, only works when a series of 
preconditions are met.”116   
Buck et al. expressed concern for ICS’s lack of focus on coordination between 
organizations and levels of government responding to disaster. The debate has gained 
importance since the federal government’s mandate to make ICS the disaster operations 
standard. They assert that ICS is flawed and that ICS usage may exacerbate the 
difficulties in the organization of emergency response.117  
Since NIMS and ICS had been adopted by numerous federal agencies including 
FEMA, the Forest Service, and the Coast Guard,118 little discussion or criticism emerged 
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arguing the benefits or detractions individual components of the system. The federal 
government assumed that ICS was an all-or-nothing proposal and no alternatives were 
discussed. However, there are alternatives. The Incident Command System is based upon 
five basic functions: command, operations, planning, logistics and finance. However, 
little discussion enters into the discourse, if these are the only basic functions. It can be 
argued that the demands for public information in large-scale emergencies has become so 
demanding that public information should be a discrete function in its own right. The 
United Kingdom’s Gold, Silver, Bronze system is another example of incident 
management that should enter into the debate.119  
The current ICS has communications as a sub-function of logistics. That may not 
be the most appropriate place or level of function within the ICS. As stated, the 911 
Report lists communication as a fault with the Pentagon response. Would elevating 
communication to a basic function reduce issues?  The Australian ICS is very similar to 
the United States version. It lists communication among the basic functions.120  Australia 
also lists public information in as a basic function. Due to fires in 2009, Australia raised 
the function of public information to a separate section reporting directly to the incident 
commander. 
Discussions about the ICS have been mixed. Parts of the response community 
offer praise, while others are critical of ICS. To paraphrase Winston Churchill’s 
comments on democracy, it has been said that the Incident Command System is the worst 
form of incident management except all the others that have been tried. However, that 
does not mean we stop debating and attempting to improve on the system. ICS works 
well when official responders have trained in ICS and have a strong sense of community. 
However, the case is not closed on how the system can be improved. The next chapter 
defines the identified communication problems in more detail and research methodology 
with the intent of creating a stronger system. 
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IV. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM—COMMUNICATIONS 
FAILURES IN THE ICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter further defines the problem and discusses the research questions. In 
addition, Chapter IV explores the research methodology, Soft Systems Methodology 
(SSM).  SSM is designed to shape interventions in the problematic situations encountered 
in complex organizational contexts, where there are often no easily identified solutions. 
Though aligned with systems engineering approaches, it breaks with them by recognizing 
the central importance of perspective or world-view in social situations.121  
Information is the most valuable commodity during emergencies or disasters. It is 
what everyone needs to make decisions. It is an essential aspect in an organization’s 
ability to gain (or lose) command and control, visibility, and credibility. Above all, it is 
necessary for rapid and effective assistance for those affected by a disaster. 122 
As stated in the NIMS documents, 
Effective emergency management and incident response activities rely on 
effective, flexible communications and information systems that provide 
information and a common operating picture to emergency management, 
response personnel and the public. Communications properly planned, 
established, and applied enable the dissemination of information among 
command and support elements and, as appropriate, cooperating agencies 
and organizations.123   
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Successful communications and information management require that emergency 
management and response personnel use standardized communications types. NIMS 
describe these types as:  
• Strategic Communications: High-level directions, including resource 
priority decisions, roles and responsibilities determinations, and overall 
incident response courses of action.  
• Tactical Communications: Communications between command and 
support elements and, as appropriate, cooperating agencies and 
organizations.  
• Support Communications: Coordination in support of strategic and 
tactical communications (for example, communications among hospitals 
concerning resource ordering, dispatching, and tracking from logistics 
centers; traffic and public works communications).  
• Public Address Communications: Emergency alerts and warnings, press 
conferences, etc.124 
Strategic, tactical and support communications are facilitated through the 
Communications Unit within the Incident Command System.  
1. Internal Communications 
The Logistics Section provides for all the support needs for the incident, such as 
ordering resources and providing facilities, transportation, supplies, equipment 
maintenance and fuel, food service, communications, and medical services for incident 
personnel. The Logistics Section is led by a Section Chief, who may also have one or 
more deputies. Having a deputy is encouraged when all designated units are established 
at an incident site. When the incident is very large or requires a number of facilities with 
large numbers of equipment, the Logistics Section can be divided into branches. This 
helps with span of control by providing more effective supervision and coordination 
among the individual units.  
                                                 




The Communications Unit reports to the Logistics Section Chief and develops the 
Communications Plan to make the most effective use of the communications equipment 
and facilities assigned to the incident. Additionally, this unit installs and tests all 
communications equipment, supervises and operates the incident communications center, 
distributes and recovers communications equipment assigned to incident personnel, and 
maintains and repairs communications equipment on site.  
Internal communications are facilitated through the development and use of 
common communications plans and interoperable communications equipment, processes, 
standards, and architectures. During an incident, this integrated approach links the 
operational and support units of the various organizations to maintain communications 
connectivity and situational awareness. Establishing and maintaining a common 
operating picture and ensuring accessibility and interoperability are the principal goals of 
the Communications and Information Management component of NIMS.125  Properly 
planned, established, and applied communications enable the dissemination of 
information among command and support elements and, as appropriate, cooperating 
agencies and organizations. 
The Communications Unit is responsible for effective incident communications 
planning, especially in the context of a multiagency incident. All communications 
between organizational elements during an incident should be in plain language (clear 
text) to ensure that information dissemination is clear and understood by all intended 
recipients. Communications planning is critical for determining required radio networks, 
establishing interagency frequency assignments, and ensuring the interoperability and the 
optimal use of all assigned communications capabilities. 
The Communications Unit Leader should attend all Incident Planning Meetings to 
ensure that the communication systems available for the incident can support the tactical 
operations planned for the next operational period and beyond. Advance planning is 
required to ensure that appropriate communications systems are available to support 
                                                 




incident operations requirements. This planning includes the development of frequency 
inventories, frequency-use agreements, and interagency radio caches.  
Most complex incidents will require a Communications Plan (ICS 205). The 
Communications Unit is responsible for planning the use of radio frequencies; 
establishing networks for command, tactical, support, and air units; setting up on-scene 
telephone and public address equipment; and providing any required off-incident 
communication links. In addition, the Communication Unit should establish computer 
networks to facilitate Internet and email.126  Newer technologies, including global 
position system (GPS) devices and voice over IP (VOIP) must be included in current and 
future Communications Unit considerations. 
Radio networks for large incidents may be organized as follows:  
1. Command Net: The command net links together Incident Command, 
Command Staff, Section Chiefs, Branch Directors, and Division and 
Group Supervisors.  
2. Tactical Nets: Several tactical nets may be established to connect 
departments, agencies, geographical areas, or specific functional units. 
The determination of how nets are set up should be a joint function 
designed by Planning, Operations, and Logistics.  
3. Support Net: A support net may be established primarily to handle 
changes in resource status but also to handle logistical requests and other 
non-tactical functions.  
4. Air-to-Ground Net: To coordinate air-to-ground traffic, either a specific 
tactical frequency may be designated, or regular tactical nets may be used.  
5. Air-to-Air Nets: Air-to-air nets may be designated and assigned for use at 
the incident. An air-to-air net is designed to be used by airborne assets; 
ground units should not utilize this net.127  
A better approach has been suggested. Rather than focus on mission effectiveness, 
which requires a specific scenario, it has been suggested that one focus instead on agility. 
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Agility is the ability to successfully cope with a variety of circumstances and stresses. 
Threats to successfully coping can come from a variety of sources. The six components 
of agility are: 1) robustness, 2) flexibility, 3) responsiveness, 4) resilience, 5) 
adaptability, and 6) innovation. 128  
2. External Communications 
The Public Information Officer is responsible for interfacing with the public and 
media and/or with other agencies with incident-related information requirements. The 
Public Information Officer is part of the incident Command Staff and as such assistants 
may be assigned, including assistants from other involved agencies, departments, or 
organizations. The Public Information Officer gathers, verifies, coordinates, and 
disseminates accurate, accessible, and timely information on the incident’s cause, size, 
and current situation; resources committed; and other matters of general interest for both 
internal and external audiences. The Public Information Officer may also perform a key 
public information-monitoring role. Whether the command structure is single or unified, 
only one Public Information Officer should be designated per incident. The IC/UC must 
approve the release of all incident-related information. In large-scale incidents or where 
multiple command posts are established, the Public Information Officer should 
participate in or lead the Joint Information Center (JIC) in order to ensure consistency in 
the provision of information to the public.129  
The Public Information Officer advises the IC/UC on all public information 
matters relating to the management of the incident. The Public Information Officer also 
handles inquiries from the media, the public, and elected officials; emergency public 
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functions required to gather, verify, coordinate, and disseminate accurate, accessible, and 
timely information related to the incident. Information on public health, safety, and 
protection is of particular importance.130  
3. Problem Statement 
The problem is that the ICS is not meeting the current needs of the citizens. 
Responders describe the situation after a March 2000 tornado in Fort Worth, Texas:  
Problems evident during the response was a lack of initial communication between field 
personnel and emergency managers in the operations center. After the tornado dissipated, 
the emergency operations center (EOC) sent city crews into the downtown area to start 
the process of debris removal. Unfortunately, the emergency operations center was not 
aware of the dangerous condition owing to the hanging glass from the high-rise 
buildings.131  
In events of national significance since its adoption in 2004, inter-incident 
communications have not performed, causing numerous response problems. As more 
accounts of decision making during Katrina become part of the public record, it becomes 
apparent that major shortcomings of situational awareness resulted because information 
about conditions was unavailable and/or did not reach senior decision makers.  
In multiple reports from the National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety 
(NIOSH) fire-fatality reports to after action reports of large, complex incidents, 
communication issues continue to be identified.  
In addition, external communications or public information systems have failed to 
meet the community’s expectations and keep the public informed about the size, scope, 
and impact of the emergency. As stated in Congressional hearings regarding the 
Deepwater Horizon spill, the flow of information was poor. Craig Paul Taffaro Jr., 
president of St. Bernard Parish, stated, “The information presented by BP in print and 
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broadcast media often erupted into episodes of frustration and disbelief as disconnect 
between the reality of a local experience and the stated information was clearly 
displayed.”132  The challenge to share information was never conquered. 
The main challenge of external communications or public information systems is 
to ensure that information is clear and that it reflects the most urgent needs of the affected 
population. The second major challenge is to produce and update information regularly. 
Moreover, public and social communication and media relations have become key 
elements in efficient emergency management. Technical operations in highly charged 
emergency situations must be accompanied by good public communication and 
information strategies that take all stakeholders into account. 
Twenty-first century challenges, increasingly complex incidents, and the 
continued maturation of networking (e.g., social, communications, information) concepts, 
technologies, and services combined have to create a schism between the ways in which 
ICS was and, for the most part, still is conceptualized, studied, and practiced, and what is 
required for success. 
Since the creation of the ICS, society and society’s expectations of incident 
management have changed. This disconnect is not limited to incident management. 
Networking capabilities have not only fundamentally changed the economics of 
information, but they have also changed the way individuals and organizations relate to 
one another throughout society. The ICS was developed in the 1970s and, since then, has 
undergone few changes or modifications.  
The failures of the incident management system create increased impact from 
hurricanes, fires, floods, and other emergency incidents by reducing the efficiency of the 
management system. In addition, the public is increasingly uninformed as to the incident, 
their expected actions, and threats to public safety. The ultimate effect is that the public is 
adversely impacted due to the emergency management’s deficiencies. 
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The multiple incidents have served to illustrate that timely communication is vital 
in an emergency and the availability of critical information can help individuals protect 
themselves from harm. Be it through television, radio, mobile devices, the Internet, social 
media, reverse 911, or warning sirens, emergency managers and emergency response 
providers must have prompt and reliable means to provide information to their 
citizens.133  
Effective communication and information management are obviously critical to 
the overall process of managing and reducing the risks of disaster.  
The problem centers on the ICS and implementation. Specifically, the scope of 
the problem is to focus on incident communications, including internal and external 
communications (public information). The problem is that internal communication 
policies, procedures, and systems have failed to keep leaders informed of the size and 
scope of the emergencies. This has led to poor decision making by incident commanders 
and other response problems. Also, internal communication systems have not expanded 
to include the information systems to supplement or supplant voice radio systems. In 
addition, public information (external communications) has failed to keep the citizens 
informed about the size, scope and impact of the emergency. Advances in information 
technologies have created a new space within which individuals and organizations can 
operate. Those individuals and organizations that have learned to take advantage of the 
opportunities afforded by operating in this new space have realized a significant 
advantage over those that have ignored these opportunities. 
4. Research Questions 
In order to assess the problem, the research methodology addresses the following 
research questions: 
1. Which type of structure would make communications in the ICS more 
efficient? 
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2. Are internal (incident communications) and external communications 
(public information) related sufficiently so that they can be combined 
within the ICS? 
3. Or, do internal and external communications need to remain separated to 
operate efficiently? 
4. Would the changing the ICS communications structure meet the 
community’s current expectations? 
5. What are the externalities that would prevent implementation of any 
recommended changes to the ICS? 
5. Research Methodology 
In order to fully discuss and answer the research questions, a Soft systems 
methodology was utilized. Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) is the result of the 
continuing action research that Peter Checkland, Brian Wilson, and many others have 
conducted over 30 years, to provide a framework for users to deal with the kind of messy 
problem situations that lack a formal problem definition. The theme of SSM is taking 
purposeful action in human situations regarded as problematical. It is an organized 
process of inquiry, based on systems models, which leads to choice of purposeful action. 
It is built around the concept of the human activity system.134  
The original version of SSM as a seven-stage methodology published in 
Checkland's "Systems Thinking, Systems Practice"135 has since been superseded in 
Checkland's work. The seven-stage model was utilized in this research. The seven stages 
are: 
1. Entering the problem situation. 
2. Expressing the problem situation. 
3. Formulating root definitions of relevant systems. 
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4. Building Conceptual Models of Human Activity Systems. 
5. Comparing the models with the real world. 
6. Defining changes that are desirable and feasible. 
7. Taking action to improve the real world situation. 
Realizing steps (1) and (2) have been completed with the problem statement and 
research questions, this methodology would fit well within the structure of this paper. In 
addition, the root definitions of relevant internal and external communication systems 
within the ICS (3) have been discussed. This model then forms the basis for real-world 
changes.136  
The selection of the SSM was made to assist in the formation of solutions to the 
research questions and problems identified, and to evaluate possible solutions. Through 
the SSM, assessment and of alternative courses of possible action will be explored. The 
assessment will include changing incident management to ensure internal and external 
communications can be supported or leaving the system as is and suggesting alternative 
implementation strategies.  
SSM offers a better understanding of the problem and solutions available. The 
analysis looks for rational, evidence-based advice:  The assessments look for in-depth 
understanding of the problem in a context supported by facts and data, and an analysis of 
the solutions available based on this insight, which will inform and support the decision-
making and advocacy. The assessments allow for skepticism, expertise, and 
independence.  
The purpose of this method is to inform and support alternative policy choices. 
The benefit of the method is that it can support the community’s values, goals, and 
interests.  
SSM is a systemic approach for addressing complex problematic situations that 
was developed by Peter Checkland and his colleagues at Lancaster University in the 
                                                 




1970s. It is designed to shape interventions in the problematic situations encountered in 
management, organizational and policy contexts, where there are often no straightforward 
problems or easy solutions. Though informed by systems engineering approaches, it 
breaks with them by recognizing the central importance of perspective or world-view in 
social situations. It differs significantly from the “systems science” approaches developed 
in the 1960s, and is more reflective of action research in its philosophy and approach. 
6. Criteria Used to Judge Alternatives 
The measure of effectiveness is difficult, since the options are modeled with little 
opportunities for field testing, thus effectively preventing the collection of a great deal of 
quantitative data on the benefits of any of the options. Therefore, the criteria for judging 
the success of each of the models must include an estimate of effectiveness of promoting 
the primary goal of the incident command system, that being to serve the needs of the 
community and to protect lives and save property. In addition, measures of effectiveness 
are judged based on how the options positively or negatively impact the assessment 
factors 
Models that seek changes in the current incident command system are measured 
as to how they affect command, control, communication, coordination, and cooperation 
within the system. A matrix of the tenants of the ICS is used, and the models are 
evaluated in each category. 
ICS is based on the following 14 proven management characteristics137 that 
contribute to the strength and efficiency of the overall system:  
Common Terminology: ICS establishes common terminology that allows 
diverse incident management and support organizations to work together across a wide 
variety of incident management functions and hazard scenarios. The models are assessed 
as to their ability to improve the use of common terminology throughout the incident and 
the ability to utilize that terminology throughout the incident theater of operations. 
                                                 





Modular Organization: The ICS organizational structure develops in a modular 
fashion based on the size and complexity of the incident, as well as the specifics of the 
hazard environment created by the incident. When needed, separate functional elements 
can be established, each of which may be further subdivided to enhance internal 
organizational management and external coordination. Responsibility for the 
establishment and expansion of the ICS modular organization ultimately rests with 
Incident Command, which bases the ICS organization on the requirements of the 
situation. As incident complexity increases, the organization expands from the top down 
as functional responsibilities are delegated. Concurrently with structural expansion, the 
number of management and supervisory positions expands to address the requirements of 
the incident adequately. The assessment evaluates whether the models enhance or detract 
from the structure’s ability to develop in a modular fashion. 
Management by Objectives: Management by objectives is communicated 
throughout the entire ICS organization and includes: 
• Establishing overarching incident objectives.  
• Developing strategies based on overarching incident objectives.  
• Developing and issuing assignments, plans, procedures, and protocols.  
• Establishing specific, measurable tactics or tasks for various incident 
management functional activities, and directing efforts to accomplish 
them, in support of defined strategies.  
• Documenting results to measure performance and facilitate corrective 
actions. 
Peter Drucker is credited with being the first person to publish the concept of (and 
coin the term) ''management by objectives'' (MBO). The key to Drucker’s concept of 
MBO is that subordinates play a major role in setting their own objectives rather than 







modeled options enhance the ability to create overarching incident objectives, the 
strategies and the specific, measurable tactics, or tasks for various incident management 
functional activities.138  
Incident Action Planning: Centralized, coordinated incident action planning 
should guide all response activities. An Incident Action Plan (IAP) provides a concise, 
coherent means of capturing and communicating the overall incident priorities, 
objectives, and strategies in the contexts of both operational and support activities. Every 
incident must have an action plan. However, not all incidents require written plans. The 
need for written plans and attachments is based on the requirements of the incident and 
the decision of the Incident Commander or Unified Command. Most initial response 
operations are not captured with a formal IAP. However, if an incident is likely to extend 
beyond one operational period, become more complex, or involve multiple jurisdictions 
and/or agencies, preparing a written IAP will become increasingly important to maintain 
effective, efficient, and safe operations.  
Action planning demands a multi-step, concentrated, ongoing process based on 
management commitment, time, and accountability. No single strategy or process will be 
right for every incident. A structured approach built with an understanding of the specific 
needs of the organization is essential for success. Effective planning usually works from 
well-defined and explicitly stated objectives. It requires analysis of organizational 
strengths and weaknesses and environmental opportunities and threats, it produces 
alternative solutions, it chooses a solution, and it states how the solution will be 
implemented. The assessment determines whether the models enhance or detract from the 
ability to develop and implement incident action plans, in addition to contingency and 
emergency plans. 
Manageable Span of Control:  Span of control refers to the way relations are 
structured between leaders and subordinates in the organization. A wide span of control 
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exists when a manager oversees many subordinates; a narrow span of control exists when 
a manager oversees few subordinates. Span of control is the key to effective and efficient 
incident management.139 Supervisors must be able to adequately supervise and control 
their subordinates, as well as communicate with and manage all resources under their 
supervision. Meyer states that the three variables that demand attention when setting span 
of control are diversity of tasks, organizational size and space, and instability. These 
variables create heterogeneous demands on an organization and prevent the use of wide 
spans of control.140  
In ICS, the span of control of any individual with incident management 
supervisory responsibility should range from 3 to 7 subordinates, with 5 being optimal. In 
tactical operations, three people are a practical span of control. Span of control also 
applies to the supervision of locations and units as well as individuals. Consider an 
incident that begins in a single locale and expands into several states. During a large-
scale law enforcement operation, 8 to 10 subordinates may be optimal. The type of 
incident, nature of the task, hazards and safety factors, and distances between personnel 
and resources all influence span-of-control considerations. At the national level, the span 
of control begins to expand to criticality 
This assessment determines whether the models expand the span of control of any 
significant position within the ICS. Widening of the span of control would be considered 
as a negative finding, whereas, reduction of the span of control is considered a positive 
finding.  
Incident Facilities and Locations: Various types of operational support facilities 
are established in the vicinity of an incident, depending on its size and complexity, to 
accomplish a variety of purposes. The Incident Command will direct the identification 
and location of facilities based on the requirements of the situation. Typical designated 
facilities include Incident Command Posts, Bases, Camps, Staging Areas, mass casualty 
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triage areas, point-of-distribution sites, and others as required. The assessment determines 
whether the model will require the establishment of additional facilities or support to 
additional locations. The requirement to establish additional facilities to support the 
models would be a negative finding.  
Comprehensive Resource Management: Maintaining an accurate and up-to-
date picture of resource utilization is a critical component of incident management and 
emergency response. Resources identified in this way include personnel, teams, 
equipment, supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for assignment or 
allocation. This assessment determines whether the policy options facilitate resource 
management. 
Integrated Communications: Incident communications are facilitated through 
the development and use of a common communications plan and interoperable 
communications processes and architectures. This integrated approach links the 
operational and support units of the various agencies involved. It is necessary to maintain 
communications connectivity and discipline and to enable common situational awareness 
and interaction. The models assess the ability of the ICS to facilitate integrated 
communications.  
Establishment and Transfer of Command: The command function must be 
clearly established from the beginning of any incident operations. The agency with 
primary jurisdictional authority over the incident designates the individual at the scene 
responsible for establishing command. When command is transferred, the process must 
include a briefing that captures all essential information for continuing safe and effective 
operations. The evaluation determines whether a model enhances or detracts from the 
ability to establish or transfer command. 
Chain of Command and Unity of Command: Chain of command refers to the 
orderly line of authority within the ranks of the incident management organization.  
Unity of command means that all individuals have a designated supervisor to 




relationships and eliminate the confusion caused by multiple, conflicting directives. 
Incident managers at all levels must be able to direct the actions of all personnel under 
their supervision. The models assess the ability of the ICS to support or enhance the chain 
of command. 
Unified Command: In incidents involving multiple jurisdictions, a single 
jurisdiction with multiagency involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with multiagency 
involvement. Unified Command allows agencies with different legal, geographic, and 
functional authorities and responsibilities to work together effectively without affecting 
individual agency authority, responsibility, or accountability. The assessment determines 
whether the models facilitate or prevent the development of unified command. 
Accountability: Effective accountability of resources at all jurisdictional levels 
and within individual functional areas during incident operations is essential. Adherence 
to the following ICS principles and processes helps to ensure accountability: 
• Resource Check-In/Check-Out Procedures  
• Incident Action Planning  
• Unity of Command  
• Personal Responsibility  
• Span of Control  
• Resource Tracking  
Dispatch/Deployment: Resources should respond only when requested or when 
dispatched by an appropriate authority through established resource management 
systems. Resources not requested must refrain from spontaneous deployment to avoid 
overburdening the recipient and compounding accountability challenges. The evaluation 
determines whether the models alter the current abilities of the ICS to dispatch or deploy 
resources. 
Information and Intelligence Management: The incident management 




managing incident-related information and intelligence. Effective emergency 
management and incident response activities rely on flexible communications and 
information systems that provide a common operating picture to emergency 
management/response personnel.141  The incident management organization must 
establish a process for gathering, analyzing, assessing, sharing, and managing incident-
related information and intelligence. 
During an incident, this integrated approach to information and intelligence 
management links the operational and support units of the various organizations to 
maintain communications connectivity and situational awareness. These systems are to 
be used to provide decision support information to managers by collecting, updating, and 
processing data, and tracking resources. They enhance resource status information flow 
and provide real-time data in a fast-paced environment where different jurisdictions, 
emergency management/response personnel, and their affiliated organizations are 
managing different aspects of the incident and should coordinate their efforts. Examples 
of management information systems include resource tracking, transportation tracking, 
inventory management, reporting, and geographical information systems. The selection 
and use of systems for resource management should be based on the identification of the 
information needs within a jurisdiction. 
In addition, this assessment evaluates the ability to implement the additional 
information-sharing network necessary for incidents of the twenty-first century.  
This assessment determines whether the policy options facilitate or detract from 
meeting each of these ICS tenants. The models are assessed on their ability to create 
preparedness, planning, equipment, systems, and protocols necessary to achieve 
integrated voice and data communications within the incident and externally. The policy 
options may hinder or ease the ability to create management structures to meet the needs 
of the incident and each will be weighted accordingly. 
                                                 




The following criteria are assessed to evaluate the estimated expectation for 
success of each of the models discussed to address the problem: 
Effectiveness:  Effectiveness can be a difficult to defined term; however, in this 
context, effectiveness shall be defined as the ability of the ICS to implement an incident 
action plan. The ability to implement the incident action plan depends on having a 
management structure to meet all the incident objectives. The models are evaluated for 
their ability to assist in the implementation of the incident action plan. 
Cost:  The cost of any change to the NIMS and the ICS will be substantial to 
federal, state and local agencies. However, the relative differences between a large 
change and a minor change will not be significant. Responders will require updated 
training, and materials will have to be updated and re-published. Large relative costs will 
be a negative finding. 
Externalities:  Externalities will be defined as possible constraints that may 
hinder the adoption or implementation of policies preventing adaption. Examples of 
Externalities may include, but not be limited to, legality or institutional lethargy. The 
assessment looks at how acceptable is the option to different people (e.g., government, 
citizens). Is the option legal? To what extent does the option provide a good solution 
beyond the short term? How quickly and easily can the solution be put in place? 
Political Acceptability: Political Acceptability is the political will to implement 
the policy options changes. The political acceptability of changes to NIMS will be a 
significant issue with larger changes to ICS requiring greater efforts to assure 
implementation. Political acceptability will be the national general attitude towards 
acceptance without consideration of the local, regional, or statewide variations. 
Institutional Lethargy:  Institutional Lethargy is the instructional resistance to 
change. The ICS was mandated for use by all public safety agencies with HSPD 5 in 
2003. Since then, all public safety agencies have been required to participate in training 
and certifications. This has created a large base of ICS users that is just beginning to fully 




potentially disenfranchised users if changes are made within short intervals. Significant 
changes now could have a disrupting effect. In order to counter this effect, changes need 
to be well explained and justified. The shear inertia of the user base will serve to inhibit 
changes. 
In addition, the following adaptability criteria is assessed  
Adaptable to any emergency:  A key component of the ICS is in its ability to be 
scalable to any size incident. The assessment determines whether the policy options 
enhance that scalability to any emergency or detract.  
Adaptable to any agency:  Another key component of ICS is that is can be 
utilized as an all-risk system for all incident types and agencies. The assessment 
determines whether the policy options assist or hinder various agencies and agency types 
to implement the changed ICS. 
Adaptable over time:  ICS has the ability to grow, change, and contract as the 
needs of the incident change. This assessment determines whether that ability has been 
enhanced by the models.  
Integrated into NIMS: The assessments determine whether the models fit within 
the conventions and intentions of NIMS and ICS. The models will be assessed utilizing a 
purist NIMS and ICS mindset. 
The following are examples of the metric that assess how the options address the 
system requirements for an effective operation. The full metrics can be found in the 
Appendix. 
Table 1.   Adaptability Criteria 
System Requirement Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Adaptable to any 
emergency 
   
Adaptable to any Agency    
Expandable    
Adaptable over time    




The following matrix accesses the estimated expectation for success of each of the 
policy options discussed to address the problem: 
Table 2.   Criteria Measuring Success 
System Requirement Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Effectiveness    
Cost    
Externalities    
Political Acceptability    
 
Another metric assesses how the options address the goals and key components of 
the ICS. 
Table 3.   Key Components 
System Requirement Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
14 goals and key 
components described 
above 
   
7. Comparison of Models 
By utilizing the above metrics, we will be able to determine the best option and 
develop recommendations. These recommendations will also have considered the most 
likely recommendations of success. 
Metrics are assessed utilizing a scale of 1 to 9, with 9 offering the most 
improvement over the current system. A rating of 5 will define a neutral benefit (no 
change) and 1 will be signifying a reduction from the current practice.  
Chapter V explores three alternative solutions and their application towards 
improving communications. Following chapters discuss the three alternative models and 





V. DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the alternative solutions identified for modeling. 
Alternative solutions for addressing the ICS communications problem would involve 
restructuring the system to make communications a priority and react to newer 
technologies. Restructuring may take alternative forms and each contains drawbacks. The 
option of maintaining the status quo also exists as a counter-point to more aggressive 
actions. This chapter does not delve into the advantages or disadvantages in each option. 
The analysis is discussed in later chapters. 
Three models were chosen identify tentative solutions to the internal and external 
communication issues. The Communications Unit develops and maintains internal 
communications and any solution must include that unit. Similarly, external 
communications are handled by the PIO, and any solution must facilitate the PIO’s 
functions. The third model combines the functions into one section working for the IC. 
The models are intended to work within NIMS and cause the least disruptions to the 
concepts and structures of the ICS. Other models could be developed; however, the three 
discussed provide the most effective enhancements while maintaining ICS integrity. 
1. Model 1—Expanding Communications Unit Within the Logistics 
Section 
This option would expand the Communications Unit within the Logistics, Service 
Branch to include all current and future internal communications functions. The Public 
Information Officer remains on the Incident Commander’s command staff and the 
function of public information remains as is. The expanded Communication Unit’s job 
functions would be defined to include all of the incident’s current and future 
expectations.  
The Logistics Section is responsible for all service requirements needed to 




communications and information technology support. Incident communications are 
facilitated through the development and use of a common communications plan and 
interoperable communications processes and architectures. However, current trends and 
technologies are expanding communication beyond traditional voice radio systems. These 
trends include video, voice over IP, data, and Internet access systems. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Logistics Section 
The expanded Communication Unit will be responsible for all of the current 
duties but they will be expanded to include emerging technologies of video, data and 
Internet systems for the incident. Further definitions are discussed in Chapter VI. 
The Communication Unit will develop a common communications plan. 
Preparedness planning will be the responsibility of the Communications Unit to address 
the equipment, systems, and protocols necessary to achieve integrated voice and data 
communications.142 The integrated approach of the Communication Unit will link the  
 
                                                 
















operational and support units of the various agencies involved and are necessary to 
maintain communications connectivity and discipline and to enable common situational 
awareness and interaction.  
The expanded Communications Unit will be responsible for developing and 
maintaining new technologies, including Internet and email, data, instant messaging, and 
global information systems (GIS). The benefits of these systems would outweigh the 
expected costs. The expanded Communications Unit will develop, support, and maintain 
three main strategic functions: voice radio, data, and video. Within these systems are new 
tactical technologies that will facilitate new communications. These technologies include 
but are not limited to: instant text messaging, email, Internet capable of web-enabled 
applications and social media, and global information systems.  
Highlights of the expected benefits from these new technologies for the incident 
include the ability for a commander to send messages instantaneously to all responders in 
the field by utilizing a telephone or data network would be invaluable. Changes in 
weather, changes in incident situations, or changes in orders could be relayed instantly to 
all members. The incident commander would be able to email communications and 
documents to any or all the responders or other stake holders. These documents include 
incident action plans, significant maps, and situation reports. In addition, email systems 
are capable of forwarding messages to other needed parties and maintaining copies of 
email for later actions and incident histories. By utilizing social media, the incident can 
utilize another method to send messages instantaneously to all responders in the field. 
The ability to instantaneously communicate with field resources will improve operational 
effectiveness and improve responder safety. 
For the Planning Section the benefits of Internet, social networking, and instant 
communications would be high. The Planning Section is responsible for developing 
situational awareness and applying it towards operational plans. The principal methods 
are a bottom-up concept collecting data, developing information, gaining understanding, 
and applying understanding to current objectives. The data collection function provides 




transforms the overall understanding produced by the situational awareness into orders. 
Instant messaging has the ability to collect data directly from field resources and can 
greatly facilitate planning. 
Social media systems have become an important method of collecting situational 
awareness information from resources apart from responders. This was displayed in both 
the Japanese Tsunami and the Mumbai attacks. Accounts of these events have made the 
monitoring of social media sites almost mandatory.143 144 The information that can be 
gathered from social media will include videos and pictures from all around the incident, 
status of infrastructure, and links to other relevant data. 
It does not seem unreasonable to assume that products relating to the situational 
awareness would improve the quality of incident command. It would presumably lead to 
a more disciplined, yet more creative, awareness process and provide a clearer input to 
the planning function. As noted above, today’s products, combined with the 
commander’s intent, may allow the creation of alternative solutions.  
In essence, emerging technologies will greatly enhance the  steps required for 
controlling an incident, monitoring the situation, developing situational awareness, 
developing courses of action, decision making that selects among the courses of action, 
developing and promulgating guidance to implement those decisions, and establishing 
mechanisms for feedback that allow the cycle to be continuous by monitoring the 
situation during implementation. New technologies are going to be essential in meeting 
these steps and the expanded Communication Unit will be required to implement the 
technologies. 
The expanded Communications Unit will be scalable, in accordance with ICS 
principles. On incidents with a single agency, with the agency’s single dispatch and 
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tactical radio frequency, the Communications Unit may be a low priority. As the incident 
grows and other agencies and frequencies are required, the Communication Unit may be 
established. This unit may only deal with voice radio. Additional radio operators may be 
assigned. As the incident continues to grow and additional technicians are added, video 
and data centers may be established to maintain the span of control. These centers will be 
staffed with managers and technicians. An example of a full staffed Communications 
Unit can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Expanded Communications Unit 
2. Model 2—Expanding the Public Information Officer Role 
In the second model, external communication will continue to be handled by the 
Public Information Officer. The Public Information Officer would continue to support the 
incident command structure as a member of the Command staff and advise the Incident 
Commander/Unified Commander on all public information matters relating to the 






























tasks that the defined Public Information Officer would be required to complete. This 
option would keep the internal communication support functions within the 
Communications Unit within Logistics.  
The Public Information Officer would continue to be responsible for 
communicating with the public, media, and/or coordinating with other agencies, as 
necessary, with incident-related information or requirements. The Public Information 
Officer would be responsible for developing and releasing information about the incident 
to the news media, incident personnel, and other appropriate agencies and organizations. 
Depending on the size or complexity of the incident, a lead Public Information Officer 
would be assigned for each incident and may have assistants, as necessary, including 
supporting Public Information Officers representing other responding agencies or 
jurisdictions. As a member of the Command staff, the Public Information Officer may be 
assigned numerous Assistant Public Information Officers to fill the various 





Figure 3.   Expanded Public Information Officer Role 
The Public Information Officer will supervise one assistant, designated as the 
Information Officer. The Information Officer manages the information flow in and out of 
the command post. The Information Officer will gather, confirm, clarify, and forward the 
information to the Public Information Officer for approval and dissemination and then on 
to internal distribution channels. In addition, the Information Officer will coordinate with 
Logistics to ensure that the communication infrastructure is in place and can support 






































be assigned to handle information gathering, information dissemination, and field 
information functions. Additional explanations of duties and responsibilities of the 
expanded Public Information Officer will be included in Chapter VI. 
Information communications strategies and planning are essential to all aspects of 
public information. The Public Information Officer will be responsible for plans that 
would include processes, protocols, and procedures involving the development of draft 
news releases, media lists, and contact information for elected/appointed officials, 
community leaders, private-sector organizations, and public service organizations to 
facilitate the dissemination of accurate, consistent, accessible, and timely public 
information.  
Similar to the expanded Communications Unit, the expanded PIO will be 
scalable, in accordance with ICS principles. On incidents with a single agency, a single 
PIO may be required. As the incident grows and other agencies and frequencies are 
required, assistants may be assigned as needed. As the incident continues to grow in size 
or complexity, the expanded PIO may be utilized. The expanded PIO will have managers 
to assist with the major functions of information gathering and information 
dissemination. In addition, a key component added is a manager to keep field resources 
informed. 
The Information Gathering Manager will be responsible for the collection and 
analysis of the information. Collections should include incident command post/chain of 
command sources, news video and reports, email and other newer technologies. These 
technologies include social media and other Internet sites. As stated above, these sources 
are developing into critical information sources that cannot be ignored. One of the main 
reasons to foster social networks is the operational power of having shared awareness, a 
shared understanding of the current situation, a shared sense of the operational 
implications, and a shared intent about the direction of the incident. The ability of the 
Information Gathering Manager to collect and analyze the feeds from various sources 
will ensure that the information is vetted and disseminated rapidly. This creates a 




Additional members can be assigned to the Information Gathering Manager as 
needed. A key component of the expanded PIO is coordination with the local, county or 
state Emergency Operations Center (EOC). In conjunction with the EOC, Joint 
Information Centers may be established. Additional members may be assigned to the 
expanded PIO to facilitate interaction with the EOC. These members will fulfill the 
functions of EOC/Incident Command Post (ICP) coordination and data collection. Other 
members may be assigned to writing and research, audio/video and data acquisition, and 
information analysis.  
The information distribution functions will be the responsibility of the 
Information Dissemination Manager. The Information Dissemination Manager will work 
with the various information distribution channels including television, radio and print 
media, as well as emerging technologies of social media and other Internet outlets. The 
Information Dissemination Manager will be responsible for setting up the media briefings 
and coordinating any rapid media activities. Telephone support and Internet support 
personnel can also be assigned to facilitate information flows. 
A critical component missing from the current ICS is field information, getting 
accurate incident information to other field resources. This function will be handled in the 
expanded PIO by the Field Information Manager. The Field Information Manger will 
disseminate the prepared information and deliver it to the responders and other internal 
stakeholders. Through the application of new technologies, this can be accomplished 
through email or instant messaging. The prospect of having field members with 
situational awareness of the incident is an important part of gaining perspective and 
ownership of their part in it.  
Another component is VIP support. At every large incident, elected officials have 
concerns that only personal visits can address. This has the tendency to detract from the 
incident commander’s attention and time. The Field Information Manger will be 
responsible for supporting VIPs at the incident, ensuring that they receive update incident 




3. Model 3—Creating a Communications Section  
The ICS has four sections: Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance. Deep 
within the Logistics section, under the Support Branch, resides the Communications Unit. 
External Communication is handled by a member of the Command Staff, the Public 
Information Officer. While the Public Information Officer may have assistants assigned 
on an as-needed basis, a clear, defined organization is not defined.  
It may be instructional to discuss the differences between a section and unit. A 
section in the ICS is a large organizational component that contains various divisions, 
groups, and units. It the span of control warrants, the section may be broken into 
branches. A unit is a smaller group of single resources. The following figure displays the 




Figure 4.   ICS Hierarchy 
The commander of a section is called Chief and the commander of a Branch is 
called Director. A Division is commanded by a Supervisor and can be arranged by 
geography, along jurisdictional lines if necessary. A Group, commanded by a Supervisor, 
Incident Commander 
Individual Resource 
Unit, Team, or Force 
Section 
Branch 




is arranged for a purpose, along agency lines if necessary, or based on the makeup of the 
resources within the Group. A Unit, Team, or Force is commanded by a Leader, for 
example the Communications Unit is commanded by the Communications Unit Leader. 
A Strike Team is composed of same resources (four ambulances, for instance) while a 
Task Force is composed of different types of resources (one ambulance, two fire trucks, 
and a police car, for instance). Individual Resources are the smallest level within ICS and 
usually refers to a single person or piece of equipment. It can refer to a piece of 
equipment and operator, and less often to multiple people working together. 
This model is to merge all communications functions into one section directly 
under the Incident Commander. Within the Communications Section, all information 
collection, creation, and delivery systems will be combined into one section reporting 
directly to the IC. The importance of creating a Section is to move communication up to 
one of the five key components that the IC must coordinate. This raises communications 
to the level equal of operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance. 
This section would handle all internal and external communications functions, with each 
having a separate branch. This option argues that the communication as a whole should be 
given increased prominence through the creation of a separate function, sitting alongside, 
rather than underneath, Planning, Operations and Logistics, and reporting directly to the 






Figure 5.   Communications Section 
In this option, all communication would be the responsibility of the 
Communication Section Chief. This Section Chief would be responsible for establishing 
communication networks for voice, video, and data within the incident. In addition, the 
Communication Section Chief would be responsible for developing the content and 
providing external communications to the media, elected official, and the public. Inter-
incident communication networks will be established and maintained by the 
Communication Support Branch. Under this branch, various groups, divisions and units 
may be established to facilitate radio, video, data, and Internet systems. These systems 
will carry the information content developed by the incident to the necessary end users. 
The Public Information Officer, whose focus is community information and 
warnings, is a critical addition to the Communications Section. The Public Information 
Officer will maintain the responsibility for gathering, analyzing, and confirming incident 
information and the delivery to incident stakeholders. The Public Information Officer will 
create coordinated and consistent messages by collaborating to identify key information 
that needs to be communicated to the public. As such, the Public Information Officer will 
Incident 
Commander








not be separated from the information collection and distribution functions. Formulation 
of warnings that are accurate and timely and take full account of the situation on the 
incident depends on an adequate flow of information; this flow of information is the 
responsibility of the Public Information Branch. Multiple groups, divisions, and units can 
be established to support the Public Information Officer.  
The Public Information Branch will be responsible for developing and deploying 
Joint Information Systems (JIS) and participating in Joint Information Centers (JIC). The 
JIC is a central location that facilitates operation of the JIS, where personnel with public 
information responsibilities perform critical emergency information functions, crisis 
communications, and public affairs functions. These systems will provide the mechanism 
to organize, integrate, and coordinate information to ensure timely, accurate, accessible, 
and consistent messaging across multiple jurisdictions and/or disciplines with Non-
Government Organizations (NGO) and the private sector. The JIS will include the plans, 
protocols, procedures, and structures used to provide all public information in a complex 
incident. For smaller, less complex incidents Public Information Branch might consist of 
only one member, who will combine the roles of branch leader and Public Information 
Officer.  
The described three options are not mutually exclusive. One, more, or a 
combination may be selected to fit the needs of future homeland security events. 
Expansion of the Communications Unit and expansion of the PIO may work 
concurrently. 
In the following chapter, the three models are assessed individually to evaluate 
their project effectiveness in reducing the communication issues, while adhering to the 






























VI. PROJECTED OUTCOMES FROM ALTERNATIVE 
SOLUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Herein, the research begins the structured debate about the desirable and feasible 
change. Utilizing the matrix developed of the key concepts, adaptability criteria, and 
criteria measuring success assessed against the models, the research identifies the 
optimum models to recommend. The recommendations will also have considered the 
most likely recommendations of success.  
The research utilizes a single-impact analysis on each of the 14 key components, 
5 adaptability criteria and 4 criteria measuring success. Single-impact analysis is a 
method of codifying simple cause and effect links in the format of a matrix. Single-
impact analysis uses assessments in a one directional study of a complex system. When 
conducting the single impact analysis, it was first necessary to identify and develop the 
alternative models for assessment and the measurable components of each model. For 
this evaluation, the 14 key components of the ICS were selected to ensure that the models 
retained the original concepts of the ICS. In addition, the 5 adaptability criteria and 4 
criteria measuring success were identified as components estimating expectation for success 
of each of the policy options. The components are then assessed individually for each model 
as to how well they will work in each scenario.145  This method was selected to isolate 
the variables for review, and measure the effects based on the definitions of the 
component in Chapter IV. Each effect is given a number based on the level of impact. 
Metrics are assessed utilizing a scale of 1 to 9, with 9 offering the most improvement 
over the current system. A rating of 5 will define a neutral benefit (no change) and 1 will 
be signifying a reduction from the current practice. The assessments are found in Tables 
4, 5, and the Appendix.  
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The findings displayed in Table 4 show that when assessing the three models 
against the 14 key components identified in the development of ICS, Model 3, Creating a 
Communications Section showed the most improvement over the current system. In 
addition, Model 1, Expanding the Communications Unit and Model 2, Expanded PIO 
Role, displayed improvement over the current. 
The assessments of the 5 adaptability criteria and 4 criteria measuring success are 
displayed in Table 5. These criteria, in many ways, may be more significant than the 14 
key components. Costs, externalities, and political will may have greater impacts into the 
adaption of the recommendations than other factors. Each finding is discussed in detail 
below for the three models.  
1. Model 1—Expanding Communications Unit Within the Logistics 
Section 
All units on an incident require effective and efficient information, and that 
information traverses through communication networks established by the 
Communications Unit. Since all units on an incident contribute to the establishment of 
situational awareness of the operational environment, it is important that they be able to 
transmit this situational awareness and the history of their own activities to their 
commanding officers. Conversely, it is imperative that operating units receive relevant 
and up-to-date information on the current situation, the required mission information and 
the intended effect. In addition, the incident commander must receive feedback to the 
plans being implemented in order to create plans for the next operational periods. In order 
to accomplish this, the Communications Unit establishes networks. 
By expanding the Communications Unit within the Logistics Section, we can 
expect to create a more robust internal communication support function. The 
Communications Unit will develop and support the various communication channels of 
the incident. In addition, the Communications Unit will develop and support the external 






networks will include, but not be limited to, voice, video, and data. Also, Internet 
functionality must be developed and maintained to capitalize on off-site data sources and 
social networks. 
The assessment of the 14 key components, 5 adaptability criteria and 4 criteria 
measuring success is based on the definitions outlined in Chapter IV. The current ICS 
structure has been identified as having a baseline of 5. Improvements from the current 
structure will be denoted with higher numbers, and conversely, lower numbers display a 
reduction. 
Common Terminology–5 The expanded Communications Unit will have a 
minimal impact on the use or application of common terminology and plain language. 
The use of plain language (clear text) in emergency management and incident response is 
a matter of public safety, especially the safety of emergency management/response 
personnel and those affected by the incident. Common terminology and plain language 
are parts of the content of the systems and should not be affected. 
Modular Organization–6 The expanded Communications Unit will facilitate a 
modular organization. The ICS organizational structure develops in a modular fashion 
based on the size and complexity of the incident and this unit can be expanded as the 
incident is needed. On smaller, single agency incidents where only voice radio is needed, 
those components can be built out. In larger incidents, all positions may be filled. 
Management by Objectives–7 The expanded Communications Unit will 
improve on the ability to create and implement management by objectives. Key 
objectives always involve developing and maintaining communication networks to 
ensure responder and public safety. The expansion of the Communication Unit will 
facilitate accomplishing those objectives.  
Incident Action Planning–6 The expanded Communications Unit will improve 
the ability to develop and implement incident action plans, in addition to contingency and 
emergency plans, however, voice and data networks become increasing fragile as they 




Manageable Span of Control–6 The Communications Unit is commanded by 
a Unit Leader. Reporting to the unit leader can be various positions, including but not 
limited to, radio technicians, video technicians, data technicians, and radio operators. 
Communications Unit staffing needs may vary according to the scope and scale of the 
incident. More radio operators, video, data, and radio technicians are needed as more 
agencies and responders are involved. Multiple communications units may be necessary 
due to geographical considerations. 
The Incident Communications Center Manager, Data Center Manager, or Video 
Center Manager positions may be filled when the unit leader’s span of control would be 
exceeded, either by the complexity of the incident, requiring an unusual degree of 
involvement in incident action planning, or by the number of technicians and radio 
operators assigned to the unit. 
Incident Facilities and Locations–5 The expanded Communications Unit will 
have little effect on incident facilities and locations, other than the possibility of creating 
dispatch and data centers. 
Comprehensive Resource Management–6 The expanded Communications Unit 
will facilitate resource status by allowing multiple methods to feed status to the Planning 
Section. Units would be able to utilize text messaging and email to update status.  
Integrated Communications–8 The expanded Communications Unit will 
improve the ability of an incident to develop a common communications plan and 
interoperable communications processes and architectures. In addition, the utilization of 
video and data systems will also facilitate more integrated communications. 
The Communications Unit is required to develop policies, procedures, and 
systems to keep the leaders informed of the size and scope of the emergency, and ensure 
that those systems are capable to convey information and orders to operating forces. The 
expanded Communications Unit will be responsible for all of those current duties, but 




Establishment and Transfer of Command–5–The expanded Communications 
Unit will not alter the establishment and transfer of command. However, by establishing 
the hierarchical structure within the expanded communication unit, when addition 
Communication Technicians (COMT) or Radio Operators (RADO) are added, the 
Communications Unit Leader (COML) has the ability to add managers to maintain the 
span of control. This will facilitate and maintain the transfer of command. 
Chain of Command and Unity of Command–5  The expanded Communications 
Unit will not alter the chain of command and unity of command. Communication 
technicians will continue to report to the communication unit leader or managers when 
established. 
Unified Command–5  The expanded Communications Unit will not affect the 
ability of the incident to form under a unified command.  
Accountability–5 The expanded Communications Unit will not affect 
accountability. In future applications, the use of new technologies to monitor responders 
will require addition networks. The expanded communication unit will be in the position 
the implement these newer technologies as they become available. 
Dispatch/Deployment–5  The expanded Communications Unit will not change 
the ability of the unit to facilitate dispatch or deployment. These functions are currently 
facilitated by the communications unit and adding the networking functionality will not 
alter these functions. 
Information and Intelligence Management–8  The expanded Communications 
Unit will improve on the incident’s ability to move, store, and utilize information. 
Information and intelligence are the keystones of effective sense making, and the 
utilization of data and video networks, in addition to voice networks, will improve the 
channels for information flows. 
The expanded Communications Unit will be responsible for developing and 





global information systems. The benefits of these systems would outweigh the expected 
costs. Highlights of the expected benefits from these new technologies for the incident 
commander include: 
The ability for a commander to utilize instant messaging to send messages 
instantaneously to all responders in the field utilizing a telephone or data network would 
be invaluable. Changes in weather, changes in incident situations, or changes in orders 
could be relayed instantly all members. 
The incident commander would be able to email communications and documents 
to any or all the responders or other stake holders. These documents include incident 
action plans, significant maps, and situation reports. In addition, email systems are 
capable of forwarding messages to other needed parties, and maintaining copies of email 
for later actions and incident histories. 
Utilizing social media, the incident commander can utilize another method to send 
messages instantaneously to all responders in the field. The ability to instantaneously 
communicate with field resources will improve operational effectiveness and improve 
responder safety. 
For the Planning section, the benefits of Internet, social networking, and instant 
communications would be high. The Planning Section is responsible for developing 
situational awareness and applying it towards operational plans. The principal methods 
are a bottom-up concept collecting data, developing information, gaining understanding, 
and then applying understanding to current objectives. 
Today’s planning staff procedures provide examples of fulfilling the situational 
awareness function, and a first step in the research and development of better systems. 
More important, however, may be to think about the new ways of doing situational 
awareness that become possible with the new forms of technology. 
The data collection function facilitated by instant messaging provides the data 
required to gain situational awareness. In the ICS, planning is the function that transforms 




giving control to the data collection function is the most obvious way of creating 
information overload, while, on the other, pushing information to the planning section 
seems to be the best way of escaping the risk that important events are not detected. 
Striking the right balance here is the problem. It not obvious that there is a simple 
solution to this problem, and the best approach may well be a hybrid solution where the 
user exercises a high degree of control over what he or she receives, yet allows for urgent 
messages from the data collection function to be passed on.  
Email systems will work parallel to the instant messaging systems in delivering 
and receiving messages. Messages and photographs taken in the field can be forwarded 
(logged and archived) to the planning section for instant updates of a field resources 
progress. These updates will be folded into the next operational plan without having to 
wait for units to come in off the line for debriefing. 
Social media systems have become an important method of collecting situational 
awareness information from resources apart from responders. This was displayed in both 
the Japanese Tsunami and the Mumbai attacks. Accounts of these events have made the 
monitoring of social media sites almost mandatory.146 147  The information that can be 
gathered from social media will include videos and pictures from all around the incident, 
status of infrastructure, and links to other relevant data. 
The development of applications for smart phones can further assist the planning 
section. Readers can be accessed so that any member with a smart phone can have a copy 
of the incident action plan or a field operations guide. The GPS functionality can support 
mapping duties, and photography will support data collection.  
The development and proliferation of web-enabled applications will provide the 
incident with multitudes of capabilities. The ability of field resources to complete the 
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required forms utilizing web-based forms would streamline the data collection and 
history functions. Mapping, vehicle location systems and other sense-making systems are 
other examples. 
Through all these tools, the added functionality of the expanded Communications 
Units would increase information and intelligence management. 
Adaptable to any Emergency–5  The expanded Communications Unit will be 
adaptable to any emergency. In keeping with the modular functionality of the ICS, the 
unit has the ability to grow and shrink to fit the incident’s needs. This is not a change 
from the current communications unit. 
Adaptable to any Agency–4  Adaptability of any agency may be hindered by 
adding requirements to new communications unit positions. Not all agencies have the 
ability or need to certify data technicians or video operators and this may limit that 
agency’s ability to fill the positions. However, if the incident expands to require the 
expanded Communications Unit, those positions could be filled by normal procedures.  
Expandable–7  The expanded Communications Unit will be expandable. From 
single agency incidents requiring only a couple of voice radio channels, to large, multi-
jurisdictional incidents, the communications unit can be expanded as necessary. Filling 
the positions of data, or video manager will assist in maintaining the span of control. 
Adaptable over time–5  The expanded Communications Unit will have the ability 
to grow, change, and contract as the needs of the incident change. This will not change 
from the current situation. 
Integrated into NIMS–5  The expanded Communications Unit will integrate into 
NIMS. This is not a change from the current communications unit. 
Effectiveness–7  The expanded Communications Unit will increase the ability to 
communicate and, therefore, increase the effectiveness of the ICS. The addition of data 




It does not seem unreasonable to assume that products relating to the situational 
awareness would improve the quality of incident command. It would presumably lead to 
a more disciplined, yet more creative, awareness process, and provide a clearer input to 
the planning function. As noted above, today’s products, combined with the 
commander’s intent, may allow the creation of alternative solutions.  
Internet networks, instant messaging, and email will improve the operations of 
logistics. Ordering would be expedited and record keeping would be facilitated. Email for 
messaging will prove to be invaluable.  
In essence, emerging technologies will greatly enhance the  steps required for 
controlling a incident, monitoring the situation, developing situational awareness, 
developing courses of action, decision making that selects among the courses of action, 
developing and promulgating guidance to implement those decisions, and establishing 
mechanisms for feedback that allow the cycle to be continuous by monitoring the 
situation during implementation. New technologies are going to be essential in meeting 
these steps, and the expanded Communication Unit will be staged to implement the 
technologies. 
Externalities–6  The research can find no legal issues preventing the expanded 
Communications Unit. Institutional lethargy will be encountered for any change. The 
research has not found any other possible constraints that may hinder the adoption or 
implementation of policies preventing adaption. 
Cost–7  The costs to the system for enhancing the Communications Unit will be 
minimal. Existing training curriculum may require some modifications, only if the 
discussion carries into expanded operations. The structure of the ICS will not be 
modified. Position descriptions and communication-specific training will be required. 
Political Acceptability–8  The expanded Communications Unit will be politically 






positions and new position descriptions to the existing communications unit. These 
positions will be needed only in larger incidents; therefore, impact to most operations is 
negligible.  
However, there may be obstacles in moving this model forward. Institutional 
lethargy is a major hurdle. Making changes to the ICS, less than ten years since its 
implementation, may prove difficult. The ICS was mandated for use by all public safety 
agencies with HSPD 5 in 2003. Since then, all public safety agencies have been required 
to participate in training and certifications. This has created a large base of ICS users that 
is just beginning to fully implement and understand the ICS. In addition, this large user 
base creates a large pool of potentially disenfranchised users if changes are made within 
short intervals. Significant changes now could have a disrupting effect. In order to 
counter this effect, changes need to be well explained and justified. The shear inertia of 
the user base will serve to inhibit changes. 
Culture and especially ideology in the existing public safety organizations do not 
encourage strategic change. The perpetuation of existing strategy is continuous unless 
forced by outside factors. Public safety agencies at best only tend to promote shifts in 
position within the organization’s overall strategic perspective. In order to anticipate this, 
large strategic changes should be avoided. The recommendations can be forwarded as a 
shift in position rather than a strategic change in the ICS. Moving the existing 
communications functions can be displayed as a minor change consolidating functions 
within one section. The alternative may be too difficult to overcome due to resistance to 
strategic change. Mandated change from the National Integration Center is a goal, but 
total adoption and embracement of the change is the ultimate goal. 
2. Model–2—Expanding the Public Information Officer Role. 
The public expects information about the size, scope and impact of the incident 
and communication needs to flow to the community in a timely way to assist in the 





provide the media and the community with information that is accurate, relevant, 
adequate, consistent, useful, and timely. This duty in many cases is assigned to the Public 
Information Officer. 
The Public Information Officer is responsible for interfacing with the public, 
media, and other stakeholders with incident-related information. The Public Information 
Officer gathers, verifies, coordinates, and disseminates accurate, accessible, and timely 
information on the incident’s cause, size, and current situation; resources committed; and 
other matters of general interest for both internal and external audiences.148  For our 
discussions, public information consists of the processes, procedures, and systems to 
communicate timely, accurate, and accessible information on the incident’s cause, size, 
and current situation to the public, responders, and additional stakeholders, directly and 
indirectly affected. 
Model 2 explores the scenario of expanding and defining the Public Information 
Officer’s duties and responsibilities and creating position descriptions for additional 
members working under that position to fill those duties. The PIO is an essential position; 
currently, that position is on the incident commander’s command staff. The model’s 
position is that the PIO remain on the command staff. However, as a member of the 
command staff, the PIO is allowed assistants. The ability to add managers to help reduce 
the span of control is not allowed under current ICS conventions. Therefore, when the 
PIO model is filled out, numerous assistants will be assigned. 
Common Terminology–5  The expanded PIO model will not change the ability 
towards use of common terminology throughout the incident or the ability to utilize that 
terminology throughout. 
Modular Organization–5  The expanded PIO model will facilitate a modular 
organization. The ICS organizational structure develops in a modular fashion based on 
the size and complexity of the incident and PIO functions can be expanded as the incident 
                                                 




is needed. On smaller, single agency incidents, where a single PIO is needed, that role 
can be filled. In larger incidents, all functions and positions may be filled. 
Management by Objectives–7  The expanded PIO model will improve on the 
ability to create and implement management by objectives. Key objectives always 
involve developing and maintaining public information networks to ensure responder and 
public safety. The expansion of the PIO roles will facilitate accomplishing those 
objectives.  
Incident Action Planning–6  The expanded PIO model will facilitate incident 
action planning. The expanded PIO will be able to develop media plans, in addition to 
contingency and emergency plans.  
Manageable Span of Control–3  As a member of the command staff, the PIO is 
allowed to have assistants as direct reports. However, this does not allow for the creation 
of a hierarchal structure with managers and units under them. Technically, all the 
members under the PIO have the same ICS rank as assistant. This in turn violates the 
concepts of span of control. Creating the expanded PIO under the current configuration 
violates the established tenants of the ICS. 
Incident Facilities and Locations–5  The expanded PIO model will have little 
impact on facilities and locations.  
Comprehensive Resource Management–5  The expanded PIO model will have 
no impact on resource management. 
Integrated Communications–6  The expanded PIO model will have minor 
impacts on integrated communications. The expanded PIO will utilize new technologies 
to reach the public and stakeholders. The expanded PIO will facilitate information flows 
to the incident commander and from the IC to the field resources. The utilization for new 
technologies of instant messaging, the FIM has the capability of developing overall 




Establishment and Transfer of Command–5  The expanded PIO model will not 
affect the establishment or transfer of command. However, with the establishment of the 
expanded PIO function, the internal transfer of command may be facilitated. 
Chain of Command and Unity of Command–4  The expanded PIO model will be 
negatively affect the chain of command. By assigning numerous assistants to the PIO, 
without the ability to assign rank, could impact the chain of command. 
Unified Command–5  The expanded PIO model will not impact the concept of 
unified command.  
Accountability–5  The expanded PIO model will not impact accountability.  
Dispatch/Deployment–5  The expanded PIO model will not impact dispatch or 
deployment . 
Information and Intelligence Management – 8  The expanded PIO model will 
greatly enhance information and intelligence. The ability to reach out to media, social 
media and the Internet will create additional capabilities and resources to gain situational 
awareness. The ability to keep field members informed through new technologies will 
also help information flows. 
The PIO accomplished this mission through a four-step process. Gathering 
information is the first step in the process of getting information to the public and 
additional stakeholders. Information is collected from various sources, including the ICS 
chain of command, media accounts, and witnesses. The next step in the process is to 
verify the accuracy of the information that has been collected, by consulting the 
knowledgeable and credible sources. The next step in the process is to coordinate with 
other Public Information Officers who are part of the Joint Information System (JIS). 
These Public Information Officers include both those represented in the Joint Information 
Center (JIC) and those working from other locations as part of the JIS. Coordinating 
information involves developing and establishing key messages. Unified messages are 
crafted addressing all informational needs and are prioritized according to the overall 




incident commanders and others having approval authority. Once approved, the final step 
is dissemination using multiple media and methods. The PIO’s primary mission includes 
getting accurate, consistent information to the stakeholders at the right time so they can 
make informed decisions.  
The expanded PIO will greatly improve external communication and information 
flows. Situational awareness will be forwarded to the Planning Section for incorporation 
into operational plans. In addition, the utilization of social media’s two-way 
communications to facilitate information flows will quickly create additional 
communication channels to get the incident commander’s message to the communities 
affected. The size, scope, impact, and warnings can be distributed instantaneously. The 
effectiveness of the ICS will be increased due to increased situational awareness of the 
responders, stakeholders and the communities impacted.  
Adaptable to any Emergency–6  The expanded PIO function will adapt to any 
size incident. At single agency events, the single PIO will continue to serve. As the 
incident grows, positions in the expanded PIO function can be filled.  
Adaptable to any Agency–4  The expanded PIO model will require additional 
training for public information officers and data technicians. Much of this training is 
occurring; however, not all agencies have the needs or the capabilities for the expanded 
PIO. 
Expandable–7   As stated above, the expanded PIO model will be expandable. 
The Model system is more capable of expansion than is the current model. The duties, 
roles, and responsibilities of public information are large, complex, and expanding. 
Current expectations of the public are growing. Therefore, this model suggests that in 
order to accomplish the duties, the PIO must be expanded to include additional defined 
positions. These positions can be filled, as is the ICS process, as the complexity and 
needs of the incident grow. Additional assistants can be added to fill needs. The PIO 





The expanded PIO will have managers to assist with the major functions of 
information gathering and information dissemination. In addition, a key component 
added is a manager to keep field resources informed. 
The Information Gathering Manager (IGM) will be responsible for the collection 
and analysis of the information. Collections should include incident command post/chain 
of command sources, news video and reports, email, and other newer technologies. These 
technologies include social media and other Internet sites. As stated above, these sources 
are developing into critical information sources that cannot be ignored. One of the main 
reasons to foster social networks is the operational power of having shared awareness, a 
shared understanding of the current situation, a shared sense of the operational 
implications, and a shared intent about the direction of the incident. The ability of the 
IGM to collect and analyze the feeds from various sources will ensure that the 
information is vetted and disseminated rapidly. This creates a symbiotic relationship that 
will continue to grow.  
Additional members can be assigned to the IGM as needed. These members will 
fulfill the functions of EOC/ICP data collection, writing and research, audio/video and 
data acquisition, and information analysis.  
The information distribution functions will be the responsibility of the 
Information Dissemination Manager (IDM). The IDM will work with the various 
information distribution channels including television, radio, and print media, as well as 
emerging technologies of social media and other Internet outlets. The IDM will be 
responsible for setting up the media briefings and coordinating any rapid media activities. 
Telephone support and Internet support personnel can also be assigned to facilitate 
information flows. 
A critical component missing from the current ICS is field information, getting 
accurate incident information to other field resources. This function will be handled in the 
expanded PIO by the Field Information Manger (FIM). The FIM will disseminate the 
prepared information and deliver it to the responders and other internal stakeholders. 




instant messaging. The prospect of having field members with situational awareness of 
the incident is an important part of gaining perspective and ownership of their part in it.  
Another component is VIP support. At every large incident, elected officials have 
concerns that only personal visits can address. This has the tendency to detract from the 
incident commander’s attention and time. The FIM will be responsible for supporting 
VIPs at the incident, ensuring that they receive update incident information and 
coordinate media briefings with the PIO. 
Adaptable over time–6  The expanded PIO model will be adaptable over time. 
The system modes provide advantages over the current system by identifying duties and 
positions that need to be filled. 
Integrated into NIMS– 4  Because of the issue of assistants, the expanded PIO 
violates some of the ICS and NIMS tenants. The issue of integrating the expanded PIO 
into the NIMS could be problematic. 
Effectiveness–6  The expanded PIO will increase effectiveness of the ICS. Due to 
the increased situational awareness and public information enhancements, effectiveness is 
expected to increase.  
Externalities–4  The expanded PIO may face difficulties due to the span of 
control, integration into ICS tenants, and NIMS integration. Therefore, there could be 
additional problems implementing this model. 
Cost–4  The costs to change the ICS will be minimal; however, there will be some 
costs. The application of the expanded PIO will only be necessary in large, complex 
incidents. Therefore, the basic structure of the ICS will remain the same, with only the 
PIO structure changed. Basic ICS courses will not require revisions. Additional position 
descriptions and training to those descriptions will be required. 
Political Acceptability–8  The expanded PIO could be politically acceptable. The 
PIO is required to accomplish many of these functions and this structure gives them the 





communicate with the public makes this model very supportable. The additional 
functionality of field information and VIP support will off load tasks from the IC and 
may help generate political support. 
As with the expanded Communications Unit, the effort needed to create this 
change and implement this model will require overcoming institutional lethargy. 
However, working through established channels, this lethargy may be overcome. 
3. Model 3—Creating a Communications Section  
This model would create a Communications Section, which would be responsible 
for all the communication functions of the incident. The strategic changes to the ICS 
would consolidate all communication functions under the Communication Section Chief. 
This Section Chief would be responsible for establishing communication networks for 
voice, video, and data within the incident. In addition, the Communication Section Chief 
would be responsible for developing the content and providing external communications 
to the media, elected official, and the public. Inter-incident communication networks will 
be established and maintained by the Communication Support Branch. Under this branch, 
various groups, divisions and units may be established to facilitate radio, video, data, and 
Internet systems. These systems will carry the information content developed by the 
incident to the necessary end users. 
This model would incorporate all the advantages of Model 1 and Model 2. 
Internal communications would be enhanced by the expansion of the Communications 
Unit. The three components would function as described previously, with voice, data, and 
video components. New technologies would be incorporated, creating advantages of 
instant messaging, Internet capabilities, social media and email. These assets will help the 
IC develop the situational awareness to create operational plans. Then these same 
technologies will help disseminate those plans to all responders.  
In addition, the expanded PIO will bring all the benefits described. The expanded 
PIO will be able to create communication channels to the public utilizing newer 




trust in the incident command. The expansion of the PIO to a branch under the 
Communications Section Chief will eliminate the violation of ICS tenants including 
issues of span of control. The ability to form divisions, groups, and units under the PIO 
will smooth the ability of the PIO to manage and direct the direct reports.  
The creation of a Communications Section under the IC will bring many of the 
benefits described above, without many of the span of control issues see in the expanded 
PIO model. The ability to branch the section and allow the PIO to form divisions and 
groups with ensure that the model fits well within ICS guidelines. The Communications 
Section will create a stronger internal and external communications function by being 
elevated to the level of importance equal to operations and planning.  
Common Terminology–5  The Communications Section will not impact common 
terminology. The traditional terms of branch, division, and group supervisor will 
continue.  
Modular Organization–6  The Communications Section will facilitate a modular 
organization. The ICS organizational structure develops in a modular fashion based on 
the size and complexity of the incident, and Communications Unit and PIO functions can 
be expanded as the incident is needed. On smaller, single agency incidents where a single 
PIO is needed, that role can be filled. In larger incidents, all functions and positions may 
be filled. At the largest incidents, the full Communications Section with both branches 
fill may be required. 
Management by Objectives–7  The Communications Section will improve on the 
ability to create and implement management by objectives. Key objectives always 
involve developing and maintaining internal and external communication networks to 
ensure responder and public safety. The creation of the Communication Section will 







Incident Action Planning–7  The Communications Section will facilitate incident 
action planning. The Section will be capable of developing the internal and public 
information systems. In addition, the Section has the capability to develop, activate 
contingency plans.  
Manageable Span of Control–7 The Communications Section will improve on 
the ability to manage the span of control. Currently, both the Communication Unit and 
PIO do not have the manageable capabilities to expand to meet the needs of a large 
complex incident. By creating a Communications Section, we are able to create divisions, 
groups, and units to ensure that the span of control stays within manageable limits. 
In addition, the span of control of the IC will not be impacted. Currently, the IC 
controls three members of the command staff (PIO, Liaison, and Safety) and four 
members of the general staff (operations, planning, logistics, and finance). The creation 
of the Communication Section removes the PIO from the command staff and moves it to 
the general staff. 
Incident Facilities and Locations–5  The Communications Section will not have 
an impact on facilities and locations. 
Comprehensive Resource Management–5  The Communications Section will not 
have an impact on resource management. 
Integrated Communications–8  The Communications Section will improve on 
the structural capabilities to improve communications. By elevating the focus of 
communication to the level of Section, communication becomes as important as 
operations. This function will need to be addressed, on every incident, alongside of 
strategic and tactical operations. 
Establishment and Transfer of Command–6  The Communications Section  will 
not affect the establishment or transfer of command. However, with the establishment of 




Chain of Command and Unity of Command–6  The Communications Section  
will not affect the chain of command. However, with the establishment of the 
Communications Section, the internal chain of command may be facilitated. 
Unified Command–5  The Communications Section will not impact the chain of 
command. 
Accountability–5 The Communications Section will not impact the 
accountability. 
Dispatch/Deployment–5  The Communications Section will not impact dispatch 
and deployment. 
Information and Intelligence Management–8  The Communications Section will 
greatly enhance information and intelligence. The expanded Communication Unit will 
develop and maintain internal communication networks for voice, data, and video. This 
will enhance internal information management. The expanded PIO will improve the 
ability to reach out to media, social media, and the Internet to create additional 
capabilities and resources to gain situational awareness. The expanded PIO’s ability to 
keep field members informed through new technologies will also help information flows. 
Adaptable to any Emergency–6  The Communications Section will adapt to any 
size incident. At single agency events, the single PIO will continue to serve. The 
communication Unit will be filled as necessary. As the incident grows, positions in the 
Communications Section can be filled.  
Adaptable to any Agency–5  The Communications Section will be adaptable to 
any agency.  
Expandable–7  As stated above, the Communications Section will be expandable. 
The model system is more capable of expansion than the current model. 
Adaptable Over Time–6  The Communications Section will be adaptable over 
time. The system modes provide advantages over the current system by identifying duties 




Integrated into NIMS-8  The Communications Section will adapt into NIMS 
well. The Section will meet the NIMS requirements and guidelines. The Section will help 
remove some issues, as stated, with the current deployment of assistant PIO. 
Effectiveness–7  The Communications Section will increase effectiveness. By 
elevating the communication function to equal operations, the signal will be sent that 
internal and external communications are issues the IC must consider from the start. The 
addition of the expanded Communication Unit and expanded PIO will increase 
effectiveness. 
Externalities–4  The external issues facing creating a Communication Section are 
large. Inherent lethargy could stall the process. Although the Communications Section 
could be shown to be an advantage, the obstacles are there. 
Cost–2  The Communications Section will require the greatest cost of the three 
models. The basic structure of the ICS will require modification, new training curriculum 
will need to be developed, and all manuals will require revisions. This is not a minor 
factor. 
Political Acceptability–3  Due to the fundamental change to the ICS, this model 
will face the largest political headwinds. Changing the ICS to include a Communications 
Section is the most ambitious of the models. However, it also offers the most benefits. 
The ICS has grown throughout the world and changed due to catastrophic incidents. 
However, the ICS should not wait until events force the change. 
Ahlstrand et al. have stated, “A shared commitment to beliefs encourages 
consistency in an organization’s behavior, and thereby discourages changes in strategy. 
Before strategic learning can occur, the old [dominant] logic must in a sense be unlearned 
by the organization. 149  In the case of the recommendation, unless we are met with a 
significant event that clearly displays the benefits of the recommendations, change will 
require efforts. 
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The Incident Command System has been developed and adapted because of 
“Black Swans” and other significant events. The Incident Command System was 
developed in Southern California as a result of the catastrophic wildland fire siege of 
1970. 150  It began to spread throughout the fire service in California from south to north. 
Then another disaster struck. As a result of the East Bay Hills Fire on Saturday, October 
19, 1991, in Oakland, the California legislature passed a law requiring the use of ICS for 
all public safety agencies in California.151  ICS was slowly being adapted by other 
agencies across the United States, including federal agencies, when the September 11, 
2001, attacks occurred. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that the ICS needed to be the 
national standard152 and, in February 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5. HSPD 5 directed the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System 
(NIMS). ICS has been growing in understanding and utilization since then. The events of 
Katrina, Irene and Deepwater Horizon have continued the spread in the United States. 
Due to similar emergency incident management problems, Australia developed 
the Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS). The system 
developed by the Australian Association of Rural Fire Authorities was based on the 
United States ICS with modifications to suit the Australian environment. One of the most 
significant of these was to call the core operational component of the AIIMS, the Incident 
Control System, in contrast to the North American Incident Command System.153 
The Australian Incident Control System was extremely tested with the Black 
Sunday Brushfires, a series of brushfires that burned across the Australian state of 
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Victoria on Saturday, February 7, 2009. The fires occurred during extreme weather 
conditions, and resulted in Australia's highest ever loss of life from a bushfire; 173 people 
died and 414 were injured. 154 
In April 2009, Premier John Brumby announced that there would be a Royal 
Commission into the fires, which would examine "all aspects of the government's 
bushfire strategy." The Commission therefore examined the policies, systems, and 
structures needed to ensure that government, fire and emergency service agencies and 
individuals make informed, effective decisions about their response to brushfires in a way 
that protects life and minimizes loss.155 
The recommendations of the Commission included a plan to enhance external 
communications in the AIIMS. Recommendation 14 stated, “The Victorian fire agencies 
amend the AIIMS framework before the 2010–2011 fire season in order to designate the 
Information Unit as a separate section reporting directly to the Incident Controller and 
require that the Information Unit contain a dedicated Public Information Officer 
whenever a full incident management team is required. 156 
The analysis shows that internal (incident communications) and external 
communications (public information) related sufficiently so that they can be combined 
within the ICS. The Communications Unit develops the communications systems with 
the incident while the expanded PIO will develop additional value-added content for 
those systems. The two functions of internal and external communications can be 
consolidated into a single section to gain efficiencies. 
ICS provides a flexible core mechanism for coordinated and collaborative 
incident management, whether for incidents where additional resources are required or 
are provided from different organizations within a single jurisdiction or outside the 
jurisdiction, or for complex incidents with national implications. Incident management 
                                                 







approaches are the fulcrum of an Information Age transformation; understanding 
command and control is among the most important and urgent tasks we have on the 
critical path to transformation and the ability to meet twenty-first century challenges. 
A critical piece of command and control is communications. Within the structure 
of the ICS, communications has been identified as weaknesses, and alternative models 
have been designed. The analysis and trade-offs of each model has been discussed in 
order to identify the best possible recommendation to support.  
The final chapter presents a summary of the assessments and the final 






VII. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter VII l summarizes the models and presents the findings, which include the 
summary of each of the key components and present the recommendations. In addition, 
this chapter identifies areas of further study. 
The ICS allowed Southern California wildland fire protection agencies to “make a 
quantum jump” in their capabilities and ability to effectively coordinate interagency 
action and in the allocation of resources in dynamic, multiple-fire situations. Since then, 
ICS has spread throughout the United States and to other countries. While being adopted 
by other agencies, the ICS has gone through a maturation process. ICS has been assessed 
and modified to make the system work more effectively and efficiently in all-hazards 
incidents. This process continues today. Part of this process is the constant review of 
incidents and events where ICS was utilized to gather the lessons learned and question 
whether the current state is the best possible configuration. 
Based on assessments and after action reports from incidents, communication is 
mentioned as one of the areas that fail most often. Internal communications, the ability of 
situational awareness to get to the IC and the commander’s orders and intent to get to the 
responders in the field, has failed numerous times. External communications (public 
information) has failed to inform the communities of the size and scope of the incident. In 
addition, new technologies are pushing current communication capabilities beyond the 
ICS structure. The research questions that were studied were: 
1. Which type of structure would make communications in the ICS more 
efficient? 
2. Are internal (incident communications) and external communications 
(public information) related sufficiently so that they can be combined 
within the ICS? 





4. Would changing the ICS communications structure meet the community’s 
current expectations? 
In order to focus the research and discuss the questions, a Soft systems 
methodology was utilized. Soft systems methodology with its systemic approach for 
tackling real-world problematic situations works well in this situation.  Three theoretical 
models were designed that could improve the ICS and reduce or eliminate the 
communication issues. The first model expanded the Communication Unit within the 
Logistics Section. The expansion included new technologies for communication and 
incorporated them into the ICS structure. These technologies include data, video, and 
Internet. The tactics of these technologies include instant messaging, email social media, 
and web-enabled applications. Through these technologies, additional lines of 
communication can be opened, maintained, and utilized to increase communication. 
These technologies can reduce the friction of current systems and create a stronger 
situational awareness for all members. 
The second model focused on external communications and the Public 
Information Officer. This model expanded the PIO and defined the positions to 
accomplish the duties and responsibilities of the PIO. In addition, the model included the 
use of new technologies to facilities communication with the communities involved. As 
seen in recent events, the use of technology to send and receive important information is 
happening and is going to grow in the future. This model realized this and incorporates 
that into the ICS structure. Sensing information from nontraditional sources and pushing 
information out using social media will be invaluable for the IC in the future. The 
methods enabled with the expanded PIO will open lines of communication, creating 
flowing information. The result will be a stronger trust in the incident.  
The third model discussed combines the internal and external communication 
functions into a Communications Section working directly for the IC. This creates a fifth 
section alongside Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance. This elevates 
communication to equal importance. By this alone, communication becomes of primary 




Communications Unit and the expanded PIO model can be maintained. The expanded 
Communications Unit, with new technology capabilities and the expanded PIO can be 
incorporated. Therefore, the described advantages of both can be realized. The 
Communications Unit will be responsible for developing voice, data, and video networks 
for the incident, and the PIO will develop the content for those networks. The internal 
and external communication functions will work under a common supervisor to create a 
stronger system.  
1. Findings 
The data analysis shows that the option of creating a Communication Section 
would offer the most benefit. However the other options also offer some improvements 
over the current structure. 
The analysis showed that the expanded Communications Unit offered great 
improvements in the areas of integrated communications and intelligence, and 
information management. In addition, the factor of information flows to and from the 
incident commander displayed improvements. Of the three options, this model and the 
expanded PIO model showed the greatest offer of political acceptability. 
The expanded Communications Unit will be responsible for developing and 
maintaining new technologies, including Internet and email, data, instant messaging and 
global information systems. The research found the benefits of these systems would 
outweigh the expected costs. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that products 
relating to the situational awareness would improve the quality of incident command. It is 
expected to lead to a more disciplined, yet more creative, awareness process. The ability 
to provide a clearer input to the planning function would facilitate the development of 
operational plans. 
Therefore, emerging technologies will greatly enhance the ability of controlling a 
incident, monitoring the situation, developing situational awareness, developing courses 
of action, decision making that selects among the courses of action, developing and 




feedback that allow the cycle to be continuous by monitoring the situation during 
implementation. The expanded Communication Unit will be staged to implement the new 
technologies will be essential in meeting these steps. 
The analysis showed that of the three models, the expanded PIO role offered the 
least improvement in the 14 key components. This is mainly due to the chain of 
command issue discussed. However, the expanded PIO role also offered great 
improvements in the areas of integrated communications and intelligence and information 
management. The expanded PIO will facilitate information flows to the incident 
commander and from the IC to the field resources. The research found the utilization for 
new technologies of instant messaging; the PIO has the capability of developing overall 
situational awareness.  
The research found the expanded PIO will greatly improve external 
communication and information flows. The ability to monitor web sites, media reports, 
and social media will rise and assist the PIO of developing greater situational awareness. 
That awareness will be forwarded to the Planning Section for incorporation into 
operational plans. In addition, the utilization of social media’s two-way communications 
to facilitate information flows will quickly create additional communication channels to 
get the incident commanders message to the communities affected. The research found 
that the ability to deliver the size, scope, impact, and warnings can be distributed 
instantaneously. The effectiveness of the ICS will be increased due to increased 
situational awareness of the responders, stakeholders, and the communities impacted.  
The expanded PIO could be politically acceptable. The PIO is required to 
accomplish many of these functions and this structure gives them the organized 
capabilities to meet the ICS objectives. The ability to more effectively communicate with 
the public makes this model very supportable. The additional functionality of field 
information and VIP support will off load tasks from the IC and may help generate 
political support. However, the research found that the expanded PIO model has issues 
with span of control and ICS rank. The problem of the PIO having multiple assistant 




moving this model forward. Institutional lethargy is another major hurdle. Making 
changes to the ICS, less than ten years since its implementation, may prove difficult 
The costs to change the ICS will be minimal; however, there will be some costs. 
The application of the expanded PIO and Communications Unit will be necessary only in 
large, complex incidents. Therefore, the basic structure of the ICS will remain the same, 
with only the internal Communication Unit and PIO structure changed. Basic ICS courses 
will not require revisions. Additional position descriptions and training to those 
descriptions will be required. 
The analysis showed that creating a Communication Section would offer the most 
improvement in the 14 key components. Creating a Communication Section offers great 
improvements in the areas of integrated communications and intelligence and information 
management. In addition, information flows would be enhanced.  
The Communication Section model would incorporate all the advantages of 
expanded Communication Unit and the expanded PIO. Internal communications would 
be enhanced by the expansion of the Communications Unit. The three components would 
function as described previously, with voice, data, and video components. New 
technologies would be incorporated, creating advantages of instant messaging, Internet 
capabilities, social media, and email. These assets will help the IC develop the situational 
awareness to create operational plans. Then these same technologies will help 
disseminate those plans to all responders. However, the cost and political acceptability of 
this model weighs it down. 
2. Recommendation 
The research found that the creation of the Communication Section would provide 
the most benefits towards improving communications in the ICS. The section brings the 
benefits of both other models while eliminating some of the potential criticisms.  
However, expanding the existing communications and PIO functions can be 
displayed as a minor change, consolidating functions and adding capabilities within 




PIO are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may be in fact accomplished in tandem. 
The benefits of the Communication Unit developing the network and the expanded PIO 
delivering the content may be supportable. The model of creating a Communication 
Section may be to be difficult to overcome due to resistance to strategic change. The 
political will for creating a Communication Section may not exist at this time.  
By reviewing the Australian model, the research found that change can happen. 
Unfortunately, we should not wait for a catastrophic incident with a failure of the ICS to 
generate the political will to change. We should not need another 9/11 Commission or 
something similar to the Royal Commission to mandate that the communication be given 
a higher significance in the ICS. 
The recommended changes will take an expected route to implementation. The 
recommendations will be introduced at the NIC, FIRESCOPE and NIMS Consortium 
simultaneously. Education discussions and public comment will follow. Without serious 
opposition, the recommendations may be included in the next set of changes heading out 
of the Consortium and FIRESCOPE to the NIC. At the NIC, the education discussions 
and public comment will be repeated. While there is anecdotal support from many larger 
public safety organizations, primarily agencies with significant public information 
offices, smaller agencies have not embraced the need yet.  
The wild card will be an event of national significance. When we experience an 
event of national significance, and if we show unnecessary damage, life loss, or delay of 
response, the public will demand an inquiry. Much like the 9/11 commission and 
Australia’s Royal Commission, the findings may point to communications as a 
contributing factor. When this happens, these recommendations may be pushed forward. 
Implementation of these changes may be mandated as a result. 
Adoption of the incident command system has been a disruptive innovation. The 
organized structure of incident management has revolutionized response. The consistent 
methods have streamlined the integration of multiple public safety agencies into one 
system. The recommended changes will be an incremental change to the ICS. Creating a 




a single section. The modified ICS structure will maintain the same span of control, and 
supervisory reporting procedures will be little changed. 
In the annual update there is a struggle between the need for continuity and the 
need to adapt to a changing environment. As time passes, we learn, and thus both the 
national emergency management organization and the trends will slowly change. 
Therefore, there is a constant need to continue the change momentum, replace trends, but 
also to change their names to meet current descriptions and indicators. 
3. Areas of Further Study 
While the existing model of maintaining the status quo is not formally evaluated, 
that option could remain if expected benefits do not reach a significant return of 
investment. This option would not alter the ICS, but may utilize other methods to support 
communications. This would entail expanding the training and implementation process of 
the ICS, Communication Unit and Public Information Officer to ensure that all incident 
communication functions can be carried out. The observations from previous incidents of 
national significance makes the solution of maintaining the current ICS structure less than 
desirable from a homeland security and response perspective. One rather dubious 
advantage with this option is that it will almost certainly allow for the documentation of 
ICS communications issues, which will further substantiate the need for a different policy 
option.  
4. Conclusion 
Discussion and education on the recommendation could be protracted. 
Unfortunately, the recommendation is not testable and cannot generate objective, 
measurable results, such as improved response times or less dropped radio messages. 
Therefore, the recommendation may have difficulty proving the necessity for change, 
until the ICS fails at a critical incident. When this happens, citizens are going to demand 
changes, and this recommendation will provide answers to the hard questions the public 
is going to be asking the public safety professionals. However, the nation should not wait 




counsel and implementing changes that will benefit the stakeholders. Significant 
incidents have driven the development of the ICS; the nation must not wait for another 
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APPENDIX.  KEY COMPONENTS  
 
 








Common Terminology 5 5 5 
Modular Organization 6 6 6 
Management by Objectives 7 7 7 
Incident Action Planning 6 6 7 
Manageable Span of 
Control 
6 3 7 
Incident Facilities and 
Locations 
5 5 5 
Comprehensive Resource 
Management 
6 5 6 
Integrated 
Communications 
8 6 8 
Establishment and Transfer 
of Command 
5 5 5 
Chain of Command and 
Unity of Command 
5 5 5 
Unified Command 5 5 5 
Accountability 5 5 5 
Dispatch/Deployment 5 5 5 
Information and 
Intelligence Management 
8 8 8 
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Expandable 7 7 7 














Effectiveness 7 6 7 
Cost 7 4 2 
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